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O'CALLAHAN OVERSEAS: A RECONSIDERATION OF
MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER SERVICEMEN'S
NON-SERVICE RELATED CRIMES
COMMITTED ABROAD
CHRISTOPHER H. MILLS*
I. INTRODUCTION
W !IL E disengaging its ground combat personnel from Southeast Asia,
the United States has continued to maintain far-flung bases in which
military authorities must oversee a system of justice whose problems
are no longer confined to the maintenance of discipline. With charges rang-
ing from rape and murder to unauthorized absence, members of American
forces stationed outside the United States territorial limits were alleged to
have committed 34,837 offenses during the year ending November 30,
1970.1 These crimes, although also cognizable in local foreign courts under
traditional international law, could have been charged and tried by Amer-
ican military courts-martial.
While numerous voices are being raised against the unfairness of the mil-
itary justice system,2 few are to be heard protesting military jurisdiction
over non-service connected offenses committed by American servicemen
overseas. Yet the Supreme Court has been narrowing military jurisdiction
for over a decade. Where civilian employees and dependents accompanying
the armed services abroad could once be subjected to military jurisdiction,
they can today be tried only by local foreign courts Honorably dis-
charged servicemen are equally clear of military jurisdiction for crimes
they have committed while on active duty.4
* Lieutenant, U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General's Corps serving at the Navral Appel-
late Review Authority; member of the Colorado Bar; J.D., Yale Law School. The vievs
expressed in this article represent solely those of the author and are in no way those of the
United States Navy or the judge Advocate General's Corps.
1. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty, S. Rep. No. 92-695, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATO Re-
port].
2. See, e.g., Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need for Legislative Reform,
10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 9 (1971); Gaynor, Prejudicial and Discreditable Military Conduct: A
Critical Appraisal of the General Article, 22 Hast. L.J. 259 (1971); Sherman, Congressional
Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 25 (1971). But see Moyer,
Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over a Civilian Defendant, 51 Mil.
L. Rev. 1 (1971).
3. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 US. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan,
361 US. 278 (1960) ; Kinsella v. United States enx rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United
States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363,41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
4. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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The latest step in the limitation of military jurisdiction occurred in
O'Callahan v. Parker5 in which the Supreme Court ruled that the "non-
service connected" crimes of servicemen are triable only in civilian courts.
However, O'Callahan has not changed the extent and orientation of mil-
itary justice in all areas in which United States servicemen are found. Thus
far, it has not precluded military jurisdiction over non-service related
crimes committed by servicemen overseas.0 In fact, it has been argued that
the thrust of the decision and the practical problems which would accom-
pany its application overseas should lead courts to retain a broad military
jurisdiction over all types of crimes committed overseas by servicemen.7
This view now seems open to question in light of recent interpretations
given O'Callahan by the circuit courts.'
It is the premise of this article that cases involving non-service connected
crimes committed by servicemen abroad should not be excepted from the
reach of O'Callahan v. Parker. The article will therefore analyze the in-
terpretations of O'Callahan which deny its applicability to cases arising
overseas, and attempt to assess their validity. It will also try to predict the
effects of the suggested reinterpretation of O'Callahan.
II. THE MEANING OF O'Callahan
In July 1956, Sergeant O'Callahan left Fort Shafter, Oahu, Hawaii, on
an evening pass in civilian clothes. Before the end of the evening, he was
charged with breaking into a young girl's hotel room, assaulting and at-
tempting to rape her.' O'Callahan was duly convicted by an Army general
S. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). For an analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, see Birnbaum & Fowler,
O'Callahan v. Parker: The Relford Decision and Further Developments in Military Justice,
39 Fordham L. Rev. 729 (1971); Birnbaum & Fowler, Military Appellate Decisions Following
O'Callahan v. Parker, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 673 (1970).
6. See generally Blumenfeld, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian-Type Crimes, 10
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 72 (1971).
7. Note, Military Law-Military Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed by Military Per-
sonnel Outside the United States: The Effect of O'Callahan v. Parker, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1016
(1970). This article, written before any civilian court could hear the issue, and only a few
months after the Court of Military Appeals first heard the question, does not consider
whether O'Callahan was concerned with subject-matter jurisdiction.
8. See United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Warner v. Flemings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 71-1398, 1972 Term), discussed at text
accompanying notes 62-73 infra; Schlomann v. Moseley, 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972),
discussed at text accompanying notes 79-80 infra; Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 920 (1972) (No. 71-6314, 1972 Term), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 74-78 infra.
9. 395 U.S. at 260.
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court-martialP' and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for ten years,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.
O'Callahan unsuccessfully appealed his conviction through normal mil-
itary and civilian review channels' until his petition for certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court on the limited question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10, U.S.C. § 801 et seq.,
have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is charged with com-
mission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having no military significance,
alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus depriving him of his
constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by petit jury in a civilian
court? 12
The Court held that the military judicial system did not have jurisdic-
tion to try servicemen accused of crimes lacking a "service connection":
We have concluded that the crime to be under military jurisdiction must be service
connected, lest "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger," as used in the Fifth Amendment, be
expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indict-
ment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.' 3
Taking this reference to the procedural deficiencies of courts-martial as
their key, many lower court judges have assumed that the military's lack
of jurisdiction in O'Callahan stemmed from the military's failure to accord
a defendant the civilian rights of indictment and trial by jury."4 Because
of the near unanimity of this interpretation, there has been little critical
analysis of the applicability of O'Callahlzan to overseas courts-martial. In-
10. O'Callahan was convicted of violating articles 80, 130 and 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as U.C.MJJ. U.C.MJ. art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1970)
(attempts-attempted rape); id. art. 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1970) (housebreaking); id. art.
134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) (non-capital crimes and offenses).
11. The Court of Military Appeals rejected his arguments in United States v. O'Callahan,
16 US.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967). A United States district court summarily dis-
missed his habeus corpus petition, United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp.
679 (M.D. Pa. 1966), and its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
12. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
13. 395 U.S. at 272-73 (footnote omitted). In 1971, O'Callahan brought suit in the Court
of Claims for his back pay. The court dismissed the action and ruled that the Board For
Correction of Military Records was acting lawfully when it made his mandated honorable
discharge retroactive to the time of reenlistment. The court further held that O'Callahan's
actions were barred by the statute of limitations even though his conviction vas invalidated
more than six years after the date of the retroactively dated discharge. O'Callahan v. United
States, 451 F.2d 1390 (Ct. CL 1971).
14. See, e.g., Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.MA. 264, 265, 41 CI.MR. 264, 265 (1970), dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 44-57 infra; United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64,
65, 41 C.M.R. 64, 65 (1969), discussed at text accompanying notes 97-109 infra.
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stead, most cases in which court-martial jurisdiction over concededly non-
service connected offenses committed outside the United States has been
challenged have turned on the non-availability in foreign local courts of
the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
However, the Supreme Court in O'Callahan did not clearly state its
reasons for holding that military courts lacked jurisdiction to try non-
service related crimes. It is quite possible that the decision rested not so
much on the lack of grand and petit jury proceedings in military courts
as on those courts' lack of power over the subject matter, and over the
person accused of committing non-service connected crimes. 10 In other
recent decisions, the Court has ruled that courts-martial may not try cer-
tain classes of persons because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It
has held that article I, section 8, clause 1417 does not allow Congress to
grant court-martial jurisdiction in peacetime over persons not actually in
the armed forces. The Court has specifically excluded civilian dependents,"
employees of the armed forces abroad,19 and honorably discharged service-
men20 from the jurisdiction of the military courts. In each of these deci-
sions, the Court talked, as it did in O'Callahan, of the preferability of in-
dictment and trial by jury.2 Nevertheless, each holding ultimately rested
on the courts-martial's lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of an
absence of congressional power to grant it.
For example, in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,22 where the
Supreme Court ruled that ex-servicemen were not subject to military juris-
diction, Justice Black analyzed the reasons for and the values of a jury
trial,23 but stated that the Court's ruling rested on a narrow reading of the
15. See Hemphill v. Moseley, 313 F. Supp. 144, 145 (D. Kan. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 322
(10th Cir. 1971), discussed at text accompanying notes 133-40 infra; Bell v. Clark, 308 F.
Supp. 384, 389 (ElM. Va. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971), discussed at text accom-
panying notes 111-32 infra.
16. This interpretation was favored by federal courts of appeal in at least three recent
decisions. See United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Warner v. Flemings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 71-1398, 1972 Term), discussed at
text accompanying notes 62-73 infra; Schlomann v. Moseley, 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972),
discussed at text accompanying notes 79-80 infra; Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (Sth Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 920 (1972) (No. 71-6314, 1972 Term), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 74-78 infra.
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 provides: "[The Congress shall have the Power) [tlo
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
18. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
19. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
20. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
21. See text accompanying notes 22-31 infra.
22. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
23. Id. at 16-19.
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article I power of Congress. 2' The analysis of the advantages of the jury
system is closely paralleled in O'Callahan.2s While Justice Douglas' opinion
in O'Callahan did not clarify whether the lack of military jurisdiction of
which it spoke resulted from Congress' lack of power to make rules or from
procedural deficiencies, Justice Black's carefully chosen words in Toth2l
indicate that the Toth ruling was based on the former rationale. The
O'Callakan Court, which noted that article I, section 8, clause 14 of the
Constitution "need not be sparingly read in order to preserve [the] im-
portant constitutional guarantees [of indictment and trial by jury],"'
seems to have based its decision on reasoning very close to that expressed
by Justice Black in Toth.
In Reid v. Covert, '2 where civilian dependents of servicemen were ex-
cluded from military jurisdiction, Justice Black expressed the Court's
concern for civilian dependents' rights of indictment and trial by jury.-
However, as in Toth, the basis of the Court's ruling was the fact that
Congress did not have the power, under clause 14, to subject this class of
persons to the procedurally deficient court-martial jurisdiction.?
It is certainly arguable that the O'Callahan decision, like Toth and
Covert, was not merely an administrative choice in favor of a court system
better able to protect a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights.
Rather, it can be seen as an actual denial of subject matter jurisdiction to
the military in a certain class of cases. The scant mention of Congress'
article I, section 8, clause 14 powers in O'Callahan does not necessarily in-
validate this interpretation. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his
24. Id. at 23.
25. Compare id. at 16-19 with O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. at 262-65. Justice Douglas
quoted extensively from Toth.
26. "[TIhe power granted Congress 'To make Rules' to regulate 'the land and naval
Forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually mem-
bers or part of the armed forces. There is a compelling reason for construing the clause this
way: any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction ... necessarily encroaches on the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts set up under Article M of the Constitution where persons on trial are
surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals." 350 U.S. at 15.
Justice Reed in his Toth dissent explained the majority's action by noting: "The Court finds
a 'compelling reason' for construing the clause for Army regulation (art. I, § 8, cL 14] more
narrowly than has been done by the Congress and the Executive for many years. This is
that trial by Article IT judges and juries offers safeguards to military offenders superior to
those offered by courts-martial." Id. at 34. justice Reed argued that courts which interpret
clause 14 should do so without regard to their preferences between military and civilian sys-
tems. Whether greater procedural safeguards are offered in one is irrelevant to the powers
granted Congress.
27. 395 U.S. at 273.
28. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
29. Id. at 5-10.
30. Id. at 19-22.
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concurring opinion in Covert, no one element of the Constitution should
be excluded or considered exclusive authority for a decision:
For, although we must look to Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as the immediate justifying power,
it is not the only clause of the Constitution to be taken into account. The Constitu-
tion is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirety. A particular
provision cannot be dissevered from the rest of the Constitution.81
Thus, the stated absence of a guarantee of indictment and trial by jury
was not necessarily the Supreme Court's only consideration in O'Callahan,
especially if it is read in light of the more thorough discussions of the Court
in Covert and Toth. The unarticulated premise of Toth, Covert and
O'Callaan is the same: namely, that a civilian trial is so superior to a
court-martial that any argument addressed to military necessity would be
insufficient to justify a broad reading of clause 14 under the "necessary
and proper" clause.32 Congress, therefore, lacks the power to make such
persons or crimes cognizable by courts-martial. A common unfavorable
attitude toward military justice pervades the opinions, 3 and the common
theory of a lack of traditional subject matter jurisdiction can be seen in
them all.
The lower federal courts, both civilian and military, which have at-
tempted to interpret O'Callahan have, for the most part, viewed the deci-
sion not as a denial of subject matter jurisdiction to the military in a
certain class of cases, but rather as an expression of the Supreme Court's
preference for trial of these cases in civilian courts, where fifth and sixth
amendment rights are not denied to defendants. In cases involving petty
offenses,34 retroactivity, 5 and, in particular, overseas crimes,"0 the courts
have used this rationale to deny relief to current and dishonorably dis-
charged servicemen who had framed their defenses in terms of O'Callahan37
The Court of Military Appeals held in United States v. Sharkey"8 that
military jurisdiction exists where the accused is charged with an offense
31. Id. at 44.
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18: "[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....
See Justice Black's conjunctive reading of the two clauses. 354 U.S. at 19-30.
33. But see Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), in which the Court distin-
guished O'Callahan because it considered the on-base crimes of the serviceman-defendant
service related. This case seems to be somewhat of an about-face by the Court, in that the
opinion was completely devoid of comments criticizing courts-martial and military law. Rol-
ford cannot be seen as an expansion of military jurisdiction, but it does mark a point beyond
which the Court will not venture to limit military jurisdiction.
34. See notes 38-43 infra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 44-60 infra and accompanying text.
36. See notes 97-156 infra and accompanying text.
37. But see notes 62-80 infra and accompanying text.
38. 19 U.S.C.MA. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
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for which, in a civilian court, he would have no constitutional right to a
jury trial. The court noted that O'Callahan ought to be read "not by rote,
but with an eye to the important constitutional protections which it sought
to preserve to the soldier-accused,"3 namely, the benefits of indictment and
of trial by jury. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court had never
required jury trials for offenses in which the maximum penalty would be
less than six months ° Quoting a comment of Justice Douglas in O'Callahan
out of context, the court noted that the "'catalogue of cases put within the
reach of the military is indeed long,' ,'41 and upheld jurisdiction over the
defendant's non-service related crime of being drunk and disorderly in
uniform in a public place. The only inquiry made by the court was whether
the accused would have been given indictment and trial by jury in civilian
courts." Since the defendant would have had no rights to these benefits
in a civilian court, there was no bar to the military's retention of juris-
diction."
More detailed analyses have been given by the Court of Military Appeals
on the issue of O'Callahzan's retroactive application. In Mercer v. Dillon,"
the court recognized that the retroactivity of O'Callahan would turn on
the meaning of the Supreme Court's use of the term "jurisdiction" in
O'Callahan.5 As the court pointed out, traditionally, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction voids a conviction4 If the basis of O'Callahan was the mil-
itary's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over non-service related cases,
asked the court, would "this necessarily change the pronouncements in
Linkletter v. Walker that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires
retrospective effect?"'47 The court in Mercer never had to reach this ques-
tion because it interpreted O'Callahtan not as a denial of subject matter
jurisdiction to courts-martial, but as an extension "to members of the
armed forces in some circumstances [of] constitutional rights of grand
jury indictment and trial by petit jury."' Further support for this inter-
pretation of O'Callahan was found by referring to the reasoning of the
39. Id. at 27, 41 C.MR. at 27. It would seem that such a reading might encourage re-
examination of the fact that considerations of prior convictions may permit a court-martial
to award a bad conduct discharge, even for such a petty offense. Can any offense punishable
by such a stigmatizing discharge be termed petty?
40. Id. at 28, 41 C.M.. at 28.
41. Id. at 27,41 C-M.R. at 27, quoting from 395 US. at 273.
42. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 27-28,41 C.M.R. at 27-28.
43. Id. at 28, 41 C-M.R. at 28.
44. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
45. Id. at 265, 41 C.MR. at 265.
46. Id. See, e.g., In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376
(1880).
47. 19 U.S.C.MA. at 265,41 C.M.R. at 265 (dtations omitted).
48. Id.
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Court of Military Review in United States v. King4  that O'Callahan lim-
ited only the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction, and not its existence.
However, this purported distinction has not been explained in any other
decision. Since it followed that the defendant's conviction in Mercer was
not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court proceeded to
apply standard retroactivity tests, 0 which tended to favor prospective
application.5 1
Judge Ferguson dissented, arguing that O'Callahan was a denial of
Congress' power to include peacetime, non-service related offenses in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice." He argued that O'Callahan did not
dictate that courts should merely compare the available alternative forums
in terms of the availability of indictment and trial by jury. Judge Ferguson
reasoned that O'Callahan must have been aimed at simple subject matter
jurisdiction because, although O'Callahan was admittedly not given an
indictment and trial by jury, he actually had had a constitutional right to
neither under the applicable rulings of the Supreme Court. 3 Judge Fergu-
son contended that if the Supreme Court had relied exclusively on the
issue of the availability to O'Callahan of indictment and trial by jury in
an alternative forum
[it would have affirmed, because his trial began some twelve years prior to May 20,
1968 [when the Court first ruled that states could not deny a jury trial in serious crim-
inal cases]. Since it did not, it is obvious that the decision in O'Callahan rested exclu-
sively on the lack of court-martial jurisdiction to try non-service-connected offenses.54
Judge Ferguson further contended that Congress exceeded its powers under
article I, section 8, clause 14 when it provided for the trial of non-service
related offenses "committed in areas where the civil courts of the United
States are open and functioning .... I'll It is unclear why Judge Ferguson
49. 40 C.M.R. 1030 (1969) (conviction for smuggling more than six pounds of marijuana
into the United States).
50. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 266, 41 C.M.R. at 266. As discussed by the Supreme Court in Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the factors to be considered in deciding retroactivity are:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 297.
51. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 266, 41 C.M.R. at 266.
52. Id. at 272, 41 C.M.R. at 272.
53. Id. Judge Ferguson pointed out, for example, that in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S.
631 (1968), the Supreme Court had refused to reverse convictions obtained in non-jury state
trials prior to its decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), on May 20, 1968.
19 U.S.C.M.A. at 272, 41 C.M.R. at 272. Moreover, noted judge Ferguson, the Court had
consistently refused to apply the federal requirement of indictment by grand jury to the
states. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) ; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884).
54. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 272, 41 C.M.R. at 272.
55. Id.
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mentioned this delineation of the geographical area within which Congress
is authorized to legislate. To read added meaning into Justice Douglas'
comment that O'Callahan's crimes were committed "within our territorial
limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country,"'" would be to nullify
Judge Ferguson's premise. Either the divestiture of military jurisdiction
over non-service connected crimes is complete because Congress under all
circumstances lacks the power to invest such jurisdiction under clause 14,
or Congress lacks this power to legislate only when "civil courts are open
and functioning." Under the latter interpretation, the O'Callahan Court
would have merely expressed a preference for civilian over military courts,
based on the relative availability of constitutional guarantees. In short,
Judge Ferguson cannot have it both ways. His theory that O'Callahan
spoke of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction precludes distinguishing
offenses as to location. Under his interpretation of O'Callahan, jurisdiction
should be lacking in areas where United States civilian courts are function-
ing just as surely as in those areas where they are not.5 7
In each of the "civilian court-martial cases,""8 the denial of military
jurisdiction was based on reasoning similar to that advanced by Judge
Ferguson in Mercer. Indictment and jury trials were seen as important
safeguards, but ultimately, ruled the Court, Congress lacked power under
clause 14 to provide for trial of persons not "in the land or naval forces."
The opinions of both Justices Black and Frankfurter in Covert made it
clear that the commission of the offenses overseas-in areas where the
civilian courts of the United States were not functioning-could not,
through the "necessary and proper" clause, give Congress the power to
declare such conduct illegal because of the special needs of the military."
Although it may be argued that the military's need to control servicemen
is greater than its need to control civilians, the cases seem to stand for the
proposition that whatever the level of necessity, it is no higher in those
cases in which the individual is found abroad.6"
56. 395 U.S. at 273-74.
57. Whether there is more necessity and propriety in military jurisdiction overseas has
never been decided, and has only been argued once. See text accompanying note 219 infra.
58. This general term has been commonly used by commentators to refer to McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960); KinseHa v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.. 11 (1955).
59. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 34-35 (Black, J.); Id. at 48-49 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
60. "rn Toth] Ewle brushed aside the thought that 'considerations of discipline' could
provide an excuse for 'new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the
normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury.' We were therefore 'not will-
ing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Neces.
sary and Proper Clause.'" Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.. at 240 (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis deleted).
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Although the Supreme Court has thus far refused to clarify O'Callahan
on the question of retroactivity, lower federal courts have been unable to
avoid it. Their holdings on the issue of retroactivity are less relevant for
the purposes of this article than the reasoning they have used in arriving
at their conclusions.
Most civilian courts which have been faced with the problem of retro-
activity have summarily dismissed the issue without an analysis of the
meaning of O'Callahan.1' The first significant retroactivity case was United
States ex rel. Flemings v. Chaee,"2 which is the only case in either a
military or a district court to hold O'Callahan retroactive. In so doing,
the district court and the affirming Second Circuit adopted a "subject
matter jurisdiction" interpretation of O'Callahan, which, if carried to its
logical conclusion in analyzing overseas offenses, could lead to the unique
result of abolishing courts-martial for non-service connected overseas
crimes.
In Flemings, the court faced a fact pattern that is typical of petitions
seeking to give retroactive effect to. O'Callahan. Seaman Flemings was
tried in 1944 by a court-martial for auto theft and absence without leave.3
Because the former charge was held to be non-service connected," the
question of retroactivity was presented by his petition for an order to
change his discharge to "honorable." 5 The district court was faced with
the question of the meaning of the O'Callahan Court's references to lack
of jurisdiction when the petitioner argued that his "court-martial had,
under the holding of O'Callakan v. Parker, no subject matter jurisdic-
tion,"00 and that its decision that he was guilty was therefore void. The
government's response to this direct attack upon the usual interpretation
of O'Callakan was a strict reliance on past rulings: "When the Supreme
Court spoke of lack of jurisdiction in O'Callahan it did not mean lack of
power over the subject matter... 2
Thus, the district court in Flemings was faced with two alternative
61. One of the briefest treatments of the nature of the jurisdiction mentioned in O'Caliahan
is found in Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1970), in which the Pennsyl-
vania district court denied the habeus corpus petition of an incarcerated serviceman, ruling
that O'Callahan warranted only prospective application. The court assumed that O'Caliahan
concerned a shift of jurisdiction away from military courts due to inadequate procedural
safeguards. Without further analysis, the court applied the standard Linkletter tests for
retroactivity and ruled against O'Callahan's retroactive application, since the court applied
its version of the meaning of jurisdiction in O'Callahan without discussion.
62. 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Warner v. Flemings, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 71-1398, 1972 Term).
63. 330 F. Supp. at 194.
64. Id. at 198.
65. Id. at 199-203.
66. Id. at 195 (citation omitted).
67. Id.
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meanings of jurisdiction, and Judge Weinstein gave them the clearest
definition they have received. Traditionally, the term "jurisdiction" has
meant a simple lack of competence to adjudicate the subject matter con-
cerned. Any judgment rendered by a court without subject matter juris-
diction is void." As Judge Weinstein explained, a finding that a court
lacks this "classic competence jurisdiction" means that the "type of case
should go to a different kind of court . . . ."0 On the other hand, the
jurisdiction spoken of in O'Callahan has more frequently been interpreted
in what Judge Weinstein referred to as its "secondary meaning": "[C]ourts
have been said to lack jurisdiction not because they lacked adjudicatory
power but because they failed to exercise their power in a proper
manner.""° A finding that a court lacks jurisdiction under this latter theory
would be based on procedural deficiencies rather than on a simple lack of
adjudicatory power. If these deficiencies are corrected, the court can regain
jurisdiction. Judge Weinstein observed that the functional rather than the
jurisdictional evaluation of O'Callahan has gained favor with some courts,
but found that the language of the Supreme Court makes the applicability
of that interpretation doubtful.71
In affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit72 also questioned the validity of the view that O'Callahan concerned
"functional" jurisdiction." By then, this was no longer a novel position,
since the Fifth and Tenth Circuits (although both denying retroactivity)
had reached the same conclusion. In Gosa v. Mayden,74 Judge Clark of the
Fifth Circuit denied O'Callahan retroactive effect, but disagreed with a
district court's view of that case as "functional," having been persuaded
by Judge Weinstein's reasoning in Flemings.3 Judge Clark noted that the
O'Callahan "foundation, framework and structure" deny to Congress the
power to grant military jurisdiction over crimes lacking military signifi-
cance, and cognizable in a civilian court.7" Although Clark held that the
defendant in O'Callahan was in the same status as "a discharged service-
man, a civilian employed by the Armed Forces overseas, or a civilian
accompanying the military service overseas,"77 he would still save military
68. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
69. 330 F. Supp. at 196.
70. Id. at 195.
71. Id. at 195-96.
72. 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972).
73. Id. at $49-50.
74. 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 920 (1972) (No. 71-6314, 1972
Term), noted in 40 Fordbamo L. Rev. 939 (1972).
75. 450 F.2d at 757.
76. Id.
77. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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jurisdiction either if civilian courts were unavailable, or if the crime were
not cognizable there. 8 In Schlomann v. Moseley,7 the Tenth Circuit also
concluded, after citing Douglas' conclusions in O'Callahan without analy-
sis, that O'Callahan spoke in terms of "adjudicatory power," but agreed
with the Gosa court that this was not dispositive, again denying retroactiv-
ity.80
III. O'Callahan ABROAD
A. Status of Forces Agreements
International law does not give a country special jurisdiction over its
military forces permanently stationed in foreign countries in times of
peace. Rather, each nation possesses "full and absolute" jurisdiction
within its own territory unless it limits itself."' Such limitations have been
accepted by most countries in which American troops are stationed.82
Foreign countries which benefit from the protection afforded by American
servicemen have agreed to allow the United States to retain varying degrees
of sovereignty over its troops.
Three basic types of agreements exist. First, Americans serving in mil-
itary assistance advisory groups are protected by Mutual Defense As-
sistance Agreements. These agreements generally provide that the sending
state's troops will be considered a part of and under the control of the
chief of its diplomatic mission to that country, and as such, will be given
diplomatic immunity.' Although they typically deal with countries in
78. Judge Clark saw O'Callahan as deciding only where the crime may be charged, not
whether the military had authority to try him at all. Id. at 759. Thus, even for this case
which turned on "competence jurisdiction," retroactivity is not mandated. The Linkletter
tests must be applied.
79. 457 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1972).
80. Id. at 1226-27.
81. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). See also United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 157-59 (1933). In the International Court of Justice's Case
of the S.S. "Lotus," [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, Judge Moore, an American, remarked on
the "well-settled principle that a person visiting a foreign country, far from radiating for
his protection the jurisdiction of his own country, falls under the dominion of the local
law and, except so far as his government may diplomatically intervene in case of a denial
of justice, must look to that law for his protection." Id. at 92 (dissenting opinion). The
United States Supreme Court clarified a travelling American's position in Neely v. Henkel
(No. 1), 180 U.S. 109 (1901) when it stated: "When an American citizen commits a crime
in a foreign country he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to
such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a dif-
ferent mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United
States." Id. at 123.
82. Fifty-six countries in which American troops are stationed have agreements govern-
ing the rights, status and other obligations of American forces.
83. Such agreements are in force between the United States and Belgium, Brazil, Cam-
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which small contingents of American forces operate, a similar pact granting
complete immunity from local jurisdiction is still in force between the
United States and the Republic of Vietnam. 4
Secondly, there are Mission Agreements. These agreements provide that
servicemen and their families who are members of the military mission
are to be governed by United States military law and discipline, and will
be removed from the country at the request of the host state." This type
of agreement is also intended for countries containing few American troops.
Finally, where large numbers of American troops are stationed, Status
of Forces Agreements (SOFA) are in effect. s0 These agreements make
rather detailed divisions of jurisdiction over visiting servicemen between
the country sending the troops and the country where they are stationed.
Article VII of the Agreement for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization"
is the model for all such treaties which the United States has concluded.
This article sets forth detailed regulations on the classes of persons covered
and the types of crimes cognizable in the different courts. Any offense
which is not punishable under the laws of the host country, but which
violates the sending state's law, is to be cognizable exclusively in courts
of the sending state, provided that the offender is subject to the military
law of the sending state."8 The receiving or host state has exclusive juris-
diction over offenses which violate only its own laws, and not those of the
sending state.m When conduct violates the laws of both states, the jurisdic-
bodia, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia,
France, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Laos, Libya,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sene-
gal, Spain, Thailand, Uruguay, and Vietnam. See, for example, Military Assistance Agreement
with Guatemala, June 18, 1955, [19551 2 U.S.T. 2107, T.I.A.S. No. 3283.
84. Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina, with France, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam,
Dec. 23, 1950, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 2756, T.I.A.S. No. 2447. Thus, at the height of our com-
mitment in Vietnam, we had over 500,000 "diplomats" fighting the war.
85. This type of agreement is currently in force between the United States and Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Iran, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See, for
example, the Agreement for the Establishment of a United States Army Mission to Bolivia,
June 30, 1956, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 2033, T.I.A.S. No. 3605.
86. The model "SOFA" is that applicable to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Germany.
Similar agreements exist between the United States and Australia, Brazil, Republic of China,
Ethiopia, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Libya, New Zealand, Philippines, Spain and the West Indies
Federation. See North Atlantic Treaty-Status of Forces Agreement with Other Govern-
ments, June 19, 1951, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 [herinafter cited as ,NATO-
SOFA].
87. Id. art. VII.
88. Id. II 2(a).
89. Id. ff 2(b).
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tion is "concurrent." Paragraph 3(a)(i) of SOFA provides that within
this category, the sending state is to have the "primary" right to try the
offender for:
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely
against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component
of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official
duty.90
In all other situations, the receiving state has primary jurisdiction.
This division of jurisdiction is much more obvious on paper than in
practice. When jurisdiction is concurrent, the authorities of the state not
having primary jurisdiction may request the other state to waive its pri-
mary rights and "sympathetic consideration" is to be given to that re-
quest. 1 The United States has a policy of asking for waivers in all
concurrent cases, and has succeeded in 81 percent of the cases worldwide,
and in 92.4 percent of the cases in NATO countries. 2 However, where
the government does not ask for a waiver, nothing in the Constitution pre-
vents the military from turning a serviceman over to local authorities for
trial.93
90. Id. ff 3(a)(i)-(ii).
91. Id. Uf 3(c). See Carlisle, Official Duty Certificates Under Status of Forces Agreements,
20 JAG J. 95, 96 (1966).
92. NATO Report 4. The typical process used by the United States has been illustrated
recently in the series of discussions and agreements between the Greek Government and the
United States. The provision for Greek "home port" facilities for Sixth Fleet servicemen and
their families was preceded by an exchange of notes between the governments granting to the
servicemen and their families the same status as that accorded NATO troops under the
NATO-SOFA. Greece has given an automatic waiver of its priority of jurisdiction over all
cases unless the case has "special significance." N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
This same provision whereby the host country may "recall" its waiver within a certain period
has been in effect in other countries and in NATO countries, but the waiver rate remains
high. For an example of the possible friction which can arise when a government refuses to
recall its waiver in "insignificant cases," see id., Sept. 24, 1972, at 20, col. 4. Prosecution of
American sailors accused of robbing and beating an Athens taxi-driver was waived to Ameri-
can authorities, who decided against any action. In response, the Athens taxi-drivers threat-
ened to refuse to carry American servicemen.
93. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). By applying the tests of SOFA's article V1,
paragraph 3(a) (i), military authorities have been using at least a crude form of test for
service connection ever since the inception of the treaties. Whether this type of criterion
would suffice as an O'Callahan-type test overseas, should one be required, is an issue beyond
the scope of this article. See Note, Military Law-Military Jurisdiction over Crimes Com-
mitted by Military Personnel Outside the United States: The Effect of O'Callahan v. Parker,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1026 (1970).
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B. The Logic of the Cases
1. Court of Military Appeals
The Court of Military Appeals was the first court to hear appeals argu-
ing that the O'Callahan requirement of service connection should apply
overseas as well as within the territorial limits of the United States. The
court's first two opinions after O'Callahan concerning overseas, non-ser-
vice related offenses gave short, one-phrase reasons for refusing to apply
O'Callahan. In United States v. Goldman," it held that the offense of pos-
sessing counterfeit military payment certificates in Vietnam was cognizable
by a military court because it was committed in a zone of conflict. And,
in United States v. Weinstein,5 the court held that the marijuana offense
with which the defendant was charged violated no American penal statutes
having effect in Germany, and that O'Callahan was therefore "inapplica-
ble."9
6
The Court of Military Appeals' only extensive treatment of the overseas
applicability of O'Callahan occurred in United States v. Keaton.T Airman
Keaton, stationed at Clark Field, Republic of the Philippines, was con-
victed by an Air Force court-martial of assaulting another airman with
intent to commit murder 8 After intermediate military appellate author-
ities affirmed his conviction, the Court of Military Appeals granted review
to "determine the validity of the accused's conviction in light of the con-
stitutional limitations on court-martial jurisdiction delineated in O'Calla-
han v. Parker."99 Actually, the court found that the facts in Keaton evi-
denced the necessary service connection because the assault was against a
fellow serviceman. Thus, it could have chosen to 'qeave the matter there?"01
However, because the court wanted to avoid future confusion over the
rights of the Philippine government under SOFA to try a serviceman for
a concurrent, non-service related offense, it decided not to defer judgment
on the overseas applicability of O'Callahan.10'
According to the Court of Military Appeals' interpretation of O'Calla-
94. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 40 C.MR. 228 (1969).
95. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 41 C.M.R. 29 (1969).
96. Id. at 30, 41 C.M.R. at 30.
97. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). It should be remembered that Judge Fer-
guson, who argued that O'Callahan was more than a case centering on deprivation of indict-
ment and jury trial in his 1970 dissent to Mercer v. Dillon, wrote the opinion in Keaton in
1969. For a discussion of Judge Ferguson's dissent in Mercer, see text accompanying notes
52-57 supra.
98. 19 U.S.CM.A. at 65, 41 C.M.R. at 65.
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 67, 41 C.M.R. at 67.
101. Id.
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han, the pertinent part of the Supreme Court's decision was its ruling that
the court-martial lacked jurisdiction only because:
[T]he offenses were committed off base in the civilian community, within our territorial
limits and not in the occupied zone of a foreign country, were cognizable in the civil
courts which were open and functioning, and the charged crimes were without military
significance .... 102
The court noted that the "all-pervading factor" behind the O'Callahan
decision was the need to afford an accused serviceman "the benefits of in-
dictment and trial by jury,' 03 unless his crime is service connected. It was
the denial of article III and fifth and sixth amendment rights, reasoned the
court, that had led the O'Callahan Court to find that the court-martial
lacked jurisdiction. The military court also pointed out that the Supreme
Court in O'Callahan had established the jurisdictional requirement that
"the crime must be cognizable in the civil courts of the United States,
either State or Federal, and that such courts be open and functioning." 104
Finally, the Court of Military Appeals took note of a "large number" of
offenses which could not be punished under federal civilian criminal codes.
It concluded that if O'Callahan were given extraterritorial effect, the mili-
tary defendant could neither be returned to the United States for trial con-
forming to O'Callahan safeguards, nor tried by court-martial.1"' The ser-
viceman would therefore be at the mercy of the foreign sovereign and
would receive neither indictment nor trial by jury. The court read Con-
gress clause 18 powers "in conjunction with the 'necessary and proper'
clause"'10 and held that they are broad enough to encompass courts-
martial of non-service related offenses committed in foreign countries.'" 1
The clear fact is that, in terms of the availability of indictment and trial
by jury, it is irrelevant whether an accused serviceman abroad is tried for
non-service connected offenses by a military or a foreign court. In neither
court would he receive the constitutional safeguards to which he would be
entitled in a United States civil court. Since a defendant in a military trial
does not have the benefit of indictment and trial by jury, and since no
country other than the United States provides a court system with protec-
tions equal to those constitutionally required here,108 the Court of Military
102. Id. at 65, 41 C.M.R. at 65.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The court cited United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878), for the proposition that
Congress might not have power to make criminal such conduct as is typically charged In
overseas courts-martial. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67, 41 C.M.R. at 67. Their doubts notwithstanding,
bills have been introduced in Congress to do just that. See text accompanying note 253 infra.
106. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67, 41 C.M.R. at 67.
107. Id.
108. The court did not mention the possibility of a different result if the serviceman is
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Appeals in Keaton apparently compared the safeguards available in mili-
tary and in foreign civilian courts, and concluded that a trial by military
authorities would be preferable.0 9
The Court of Military Appeals has dismissed other challenges to the
subject matter jurisdiction of military courts over non-service connected
crimes committed abroad,"' and now seems disinclined to grant review in
cases where this argument is raised.
2. Federal Civilian Courts
Civilian courts have been no less easily convinced that O'Callahan
should apply to crimes committed by servicemen overseas. Their reasoning
alleged to have committed the crime in a country providing some form of indictment and
jury trial to all accused in its local civil courts. Would a serviceman stationed in England
have still been amenable to military jurisdiction? For a discussion of whether foreign courts
in general could operate to divest the military of jurisdiction under the "functional" interpre-
tation of O'Callahan, see Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1970),
discussed at text accompanying notes 169-82 infra; Note, Military Law-Mlilitary Juris-
diction over Crimes Committed by Military Personnel Outside the United States: The Effect
of O'Callahan v. Parker, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1039-43 (1970). It would seem that such a
distinction would be viewed as far more individious and damaging to United States foreign
policy than one between American and foreign courts in general.
109. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 66, 41 C.M.R. at 66. When American servicemen are tried by
foreign courts, Status of Forces Agreements provide that an American "trial observer" shall
be present to insure that the defendant-serviceman receives proper safeguards. See, e.g.,
NATO-SOFA, art. VII, f 9(g). Though the procedures may differ from American practice,
the reports of these trained military lawyers confirm the extreme concern for fairness ex-
hibited by foreign courts when trying American soldiers. Williams, An American's Trial in a
Foreign Court: The Role of the Military's Trial Observer, 34 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1966). The
Defense Department has even argued that servicemen tried by foreign courts are likely to he
treated more leniently than they would be in a court-martial. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 1,
at 9, col. 1.
110. On the same day that it decided Keaton, the Court of Military Appeals also con-
sidered United States v. Higginbotham, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 73, 41 C.I.R. 73 (1969) (off-post
murder of a German civilian); United States v. Stevenson, 19 US.C.M.A. 69, 41 CI.R. 69
(1969) (murder in Germany of a Canadian soldier by an American soldier); and United
States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.AA. 68, 41 C.M.R. 68 (1969) (allegedly non-service related crime
committed in Germany). Judge Ferguson wrote the opinions in all of these cases. In each
case, the court dismissed jurisdictional attacks based on O'Callahan, with the explanation
that the military tribunal, once invested with jurisdiction, was authorized under the appli-
cable SOFA treaty.
The only other reported cases in the military system in which defendants raised similar
jurisdictional arguments were United States v. Blackwell, 19 US.C.AA. 196, 41 CM lLR. 196
(1970) (unstated crime committed in Germany); United States v. Bryan, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
184, 41 C.MY.R. 184 (1970) (negligent homicide in Germany); and United States v. Gill, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 93, 41 C.M.R. 93 (1969) (off-post robbery in Germany). The Court of Military
Appeals' treatment of the defense in these cases was equally cursory.
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has paralleled that of the Court of Military Appeals. In Bell v. Clark,"'
the issues of retroactivity and overseas application were presented to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. This
court refused to apply O'Callakan to the case of a soldier convicted of rape
in Germany which, if committed in the United States, would have fallen
under O'Callahan's reach. 2 The court admitted that the facts in Bell were
"strikingly similar to [O'Callakan]," ' and added that the only difference
between the two fact patterns was O'Callahan's presence in the United
States Territory of Hawaii."4 The district court conceded without analysis
that pursuant to judicial guidelines the crime was non-service connected.'"
In addition to arguing that the military court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the crime charged, the petitioner in Bell contended that
he had been denied his procedural rights of indictment and trial by jury.
Since these safeguards could only be given him in an American civil court,
petitioner asked for a declaration that this was the only forum in which he
could be tried." 6 The court phrased the question for analysis as "whether
any constitutional rights of Bell were infringed upon by submitting him
to trial by court-martial .... ,,"7 and reached a negative answer without
ever considering whether O'Callakan might have dealt with more than the
provision of procedural safeguards." 8
Dismissing the factual similarities between O'Callahan and Bell as "only
the beginning of a trial court's inquiry""' into the law of a case, the dis-
111. 308 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971). See 7 Tex.
Int'l L.J. 319 (1972).
112. Pfc. Bell was stationed with the United States Army in Germany in 1965 when he
allegedly raped a German national. Bell was apprehended by German police (who subse-
quently waived primary jurisdiction under SOFA) and turned him over to U.S. Army au.
thorities. He was charged, tried and convicted following a guilty plea by a general court-
martial under article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. At the time of the offense,
Bell was off-duty, properly absent from the base and in civilian clothes. 308 F. Supp. at 385.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 388.
115. Id. at 385.
116. See id. and Brief for Appellant, Bell v. Clark, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971). On
appeal, Bell argued the jurisdictional issue by trying to persuade the court that a construc-
tion limiting application to territorial crimes would be possible only if the framers of the
Constitution had excepted not only "cases arising in the land or naval forces", but also
"cases arising in foreign countries involving non-service connected offenses committed by
members of the armed services." Id. at 10. Aside from the extreme prescience this would
have demanded of the framers, it may be historically incorrect to argue that they intended
to omit military jurisdiction over American servicemen abroad. See text accompanying note
246 infra.
117. 308 F. Supp. at 389.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 386.
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trict court chose first to distinguish the cases where civilians had been re-
moved from court-martial jurisdiction." ° The court interpreted these deci-
sions as aiming to protect civilians' rights to indictment and trial by jury,
but stated that the cases were all based on "the threshold determination of
Congressional power '  under article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Con-
stitution. Conversely, said the court, O'Callahan dealt with "deprivation
of constitutional rights as distinguished from an attack on congressional
power."' 22 The clause 14 power was "not contested" in O'Callahan, accord-
ing to the Bell court, because "the ability to try O'Callahan in an atmo-
sphere conducive to procedural safeguards was overbearing and in effect
dissolved.., court-martial jurisdiction."'"
The Bell court also believed that the availability of an alternative Ameri-
can civilian court was crucial in O'CallahanY-4 While the off-post rapist
in O'Callahan could have been tried in full accord with all constitutional
rights in the United States territorial courts of Hawaii, no American civil-
ian court was available to Bell in Germany. The court found significance
in the Supreme Court's comment in O'Callahan that the "offenses were
committed within our territorial limits" -12 as well as in the lack of jurisdic-
tion of United States district courts over extraterritorial rapes.12 Since,
as a practical matter, Bell had no chance for a trial according him full
constitutional safeguards, the court held that he lost nothing by being sub-
jected to a court-martial which failed to grant the rights supposedly pro-
tected by O'Callahan.127
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 388.
124. Id. No reference was made to the discussion of clause 14 in O'Callahan, brief
though it may have been. Judge Merhige did not treat the two meanings of jurisdiction
as that term was used in O'Callahan. See United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 330
F. Supp. at 195, discussed in text accompanying notes 62-71 supra. His assumption was
that the term jurisdiction as used in O'Callahan is unambiguous, reading the "functional"
use of the term from the Court's statement that "it is assumed that an express grant of
general power to Congress is to be exercised in harmony with express guarantees of the
Bill of Rights." 395 U.S. at 273.
125. 308 F. Supp. at 388, quoting 395 US. at 273.
126. 308 F. Supp. at 388.
127. Unlike Judge Ferguson, Judge Merhige did not doubt Congress' power to extend
jurisdiction over crimes such as Bell's to district courts. He read 18 U.S.C. § 3238 as evi-
dence that Congress can do so under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. 303
F. Supp. at 388. But cf. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.M.C.A. 64, 67, 41 C.M.R. 64, 67
(1969). Judge Mferhige recognized that denying military jurisdiction would have resulted
in Bell's probable trial by a German court. Though he saw no constitutional violation, be
would choose trial in United States courts if faced with making a choice of forum. 303 F.
Supp. at 389.
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The Fourth Circuit's unanimous opinion128 affirming the district court
expressed the same view that the "key to O'Callahan" is the availability
of United States civilian courts to give the defendant an indictment and
jury trial. 29 Citing Keaton, the circuit court noted that the crime was not
committed in a venue where such courts function. Thus, it ruled, court-
martial jurisdiction was not excluded.130
The Fourth Circuit believed that NATO-SOFA's purpose of assuring
speedy trials of members of visiting armed forces who commit crimes in a
"receiving State" can be furthered only if American military authorities
punish the offender. 3 ' Moreover, the Bell court expressed its belief that
any other procedure compelled by the court might damage the comity
sought by the treaty by encouraging the host state to exercise its jurisdic-
tion in a higher percentage of cases.132 Why this would damage comity is
unclear. If the concern of the court of appeals was for the deterrence of
such crimes by speedy trials, it should make little difference whether the
trial be by military or foreign civilian authorities. In fact, trials in the
local courts could even improve relations with local residents because of
their increased awareness of and participation in the prosecution of mili-
tary offenders.
Nearly four months after the district court rendered its decision in Bell,
a Kansas district court reached a similar conclusion in Hemphill v. Mose-
ley, 133 and rejected the jurisdictional arguments raised by the dishonorably
128. 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
129. Id. at 201.
130. Id. at 201-02. Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit discussed NATO-SOFA
article VII, and held that it invested United States military courts with jurisdiction, that
it was binding on all courts, and that it was constitutional. The court refused to find that
the jurisdiction conferred upon courts-martial by the Agreement was subordinate to the
jurisdiction of federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1970) which provides for the trial
in specified courts of "offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of
the jurisdiction of any particular State or district .. . ." The court pointed out that article
III, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution permits Congress to direct the location of trials for
crimes "not committed within any State," and that in keeping with article III, Congress
decided that servicemen should be tried wherever "United States military authorities are
present to exercise jurisdiction." 437 F.2d at 202-03. Thus, the court in effect transformed
the intended congressional choice of a trial's location into an apparent choice of forum in
which to try the case.
131. 437 F.2d at 203.
132. Id. It seems equally probable that trial of civilians overseas has had as great a
deterrent effect on civilians as would have trial by courts-martial, since military authorities
have pointed to no sharp increase in the number of crimes committed by dependents and
other civilians since they got their license to act free of possible court-martial jurisdiction.
133. 313 F. Supp. 144 (D. Kan. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971). Hemphill
was convicted by an Army general court-martial in 1966 at Mannheim, Germany, of wrong-
ful appropriation of an automobile, assault with intent to commit rape, and unlawful entry.
His crudely drawn petition for relief was treated as one for habeas corpus by the district
court. 313 F. Supp. at 145.
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discharged serviceman.134 The O'Callahan limitations on jurisdiction were
discussed in the framework of petitioner's contention that he was deprived
of (1) his fifth amendment right to indictment, (2) his article III, section
2 and sixth amendment rights to trial by jury, and (3) his right to due
process, equal protection and a fair trial. 3 Once again, the very argument
made in an attempt to win a petitioner's freedom put his case at a dis-
advantage. The district court easily (and probably correctly) found that
there was no practical way Hemphill could have been tried in an article
III court.' 36 By starting the court down that line of an analysis of O'Calla-
han, Hemphill lost the chance to urge the court to examine the real founda-
tions of the decision.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision in Hemphill.'37 The appellate court found no merit in the
petitioner's challenge to military jurisdiction, and stated that the fact that
O'Callahan's crime occurred in Hawaii, whereas Hemphill's conduct was
committed in Germany "sharply distinguishes the two cases." 38 In O'Calla-
han, the court pointed out, the defendant" 'could have been prosecuted in
a civilian court,' "I" while in Hemphill, this condition could not be ful-
filled.
The court of appeals also distinguished the civilian court-martial cases
on the ground that:
[Their common rationale] hinges on a very different fact: .. . '[C]ourt-martial juris-
diction cannot be extended to reach any person not a member of the Armed Forces at
the times of both the offense and the trial' . . . Thus there is no comfort in those
decisions for Hemphill.140
Why the practical effect of such a holding should differ from the O'Calla-
han exclusion of specific crimes rather than persons was not fully explained
by the court, or by other courts making the same distinction. Actually, the
basis of both exclusions may be seen as a narrowing of military jurisdic-
tion by removing a certain type of case.
In at least three other lower court cases, challenges to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the military in overseas cases were raised and decided ad-
versely to petitioning servicemen without a full analysis of the issues. In
Savage v. Parker,; the petitioner urged the United States District Court
134. 313 F. Supp. at 145.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971).
138. Id. at 323.
139. Id., quoting Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 356 (1971).
140. 443 F.2d at 324, quoting O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 US. at 267.
141. Unpublished Habeas Corpus No. 1118 (M.D. Pa., far. 3, 1970). Savage was con-
victed of a rape which allegedly occurred in Mannheim, Germany on June 6, 1967. He was
sentenced to reduction, total forfeitures and 20 years confinement at hard labor.
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for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to apply O'Callahan retroactively
overseas. The district court disposed of the case by denying retroactivity,
and thus refused to pass on the issue of O'Callahan's application overseas.
In Swift v. Commandant,4 ' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily
rejected the jurisdictional argument that O'Callahan was "on all fours with
the instant case,"'4 by relying on its earlier decision in Hemphill v. Mose-
ley. Finally, in Harris v. Ciccone,'4 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit refused to speculate on the overseas applicability of O'Callahan,
since the issue had not been raised in the court below.1 40
In Gallagher v. United States, 40 a dishonorably discharged serviceman
sought to recover back pay on the ground that his overseas court-martial
had been "invalid" under O'Callahan. The United States Court of Claims
was not persuaded by the apparent factual similarity to O'Callahan and
held that the commission of the crime overseas was a "distinction so sign-
nificant that O'Callahan loses all authority."' 47 In reaching this result, the
court relied on relevant decisions of the Court of Military Appeals,' 4 to
which it devoted more extensive analysis than any court before or since,
and on which it relied more than other civilian courts. The Gallagher court
noted that the Court of Military Appeals had ruled in Keaton that service
connection is simply not to be used overseas 4 because of its irrelevance in
the case of a "violent crime in a friendly foreign country with which we
have a Status of Forces Agreement."'00 The court found that a denial of
142. Unpublished District Court Opinion, aff'd, 440 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1971). Swift
was convicted of unpremeditated murder while stationed as an airman in Germany.
143. 440 F.2d at 1075. See text accompanying notes 137-40 supra.
144. 417 F.2d 479, 488 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1078 (1970). Harris was
convicted by a court-martial in 1950 of the murder of a German civilian, unlawful entry
of a German dwelling with intent to commit robbery, and assault, with intent to rob, against
a German national. He was sentenced to forfeitures, a dishonorable discharge and 25 years
confinement at hard labor. 417 F.2d at 480-81.
145. 417 F.2d at 488. The district court opinion may be found at 290 F. Supp. 729 (W.D.
Mo. 1968).
146. 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970). Private Gallagher was
arrested by German police on suspicion of assaulting and robbing a German civilian while
off-post, on leave and in civilian clothes. He was subsequently turned over to American
military authorities, charged and convicted by a general court-martial. After completion of
his sentence and execution of a dishonorable discharge, he sued in the Court of Claims to
recover back pay lost by reason of the invalid court-martial. 423 F.2d at 1372. For the
military's anticipation of Gallagher, see Hearings on Operation of Article VII, NATO Status
of Forces Treaty Before the Senate Armed Services Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 2 (1970).
147. 423 F.2d at 1373.
148. Id. at 1373, 1376, 1378. See text accompanying notes 94-110 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 97-110 supra.
150. 423 F.2d at 1373. The court of appeals agreed with the government's argument that
every crime committed by servicemen overseas is service connected, and that there is there-
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military jurisdiction over "the commission of crimes of violence against
local civilians by our servicemen in friendly foreign countries" would be
a grave impairment to the military's "ability to perform its mission.215'
The Gallagher decision can be seen in its best light after acknowledging
its openly result oriented stance.0 - The court reasoned that to hold that
O'Callahan divests the military of jurisdiction over non-service related
crimes overseas would probably relegate any servicemen so accused to a
foreign civilian court. 3 Thus, said the court, whenever a soldier challenges
the jurisdiction of his court-martial, claiming a deprivation of his article
III, section 2 and sixth amendment rights, he would immediately be de-
prived of whatever procedural safeguards he might have otherwise had in a
court-martial and sent to a foreign court, where constitutional protections
have no application: "[P]laintiff is asking us to exhibit our zeal for the
Bill of Rights by holding that the protection of our Bill of Rights must be
utterly withdrawn from servicemen stationed in foreign countries, when-
ever they are charged with offenses in the concurrent class."'" Such a re-
sult plainly concerned the court.1 5 Even though it refused to criticize the
German judicial system, the court noted that American servicemen are
stationed in states "which have a reputation for harsh laws and savagely
operated penal institutions."'50
fore no need for a detailed inquiry into service connection: "[T]here is no logical distinc-
tion on the ground of 'service connection' between an attack on a local civilian and one on
a fellow soldier." 423 F.2d at 1373. The issue, simply stated, is whether a court, after choosing
to examine the service connection of overseas offenses, would find that every offense com-
mitted overseas met the test. This is remarkably similar to holding that any domestic offenses
which could also be charged as "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline" of the armed forces, or as "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces," 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970), could be under military jurisdiction regardless of its nature.
It was just this sort of reasoning which O'Cailahan aimed at eliminating. See 395 U.S. at
266, 272-73.
151. 423 F.2d at 1373.
152. Id. at 1374.
153. Id. at 1373-74.
154. Id. at 1374.
155. See id.
156. Id. Before American troops are stationed in any foreign country, the Defense Depart-
ment conducts a detailed study of its legal system to determine if the fairness requirements
of a typical SOFA provision may be met. These "Country Law Studies," eg., Headquarters,
US. Forces, Korea, Country Law Study, Korea (1971), are followed by examinations of
penal institutions where American prisoners might be incarcerated after conviction by a
foreign court. Where these studies indicate deficiencies, steps are taken to "persuade" the
country to make the required changes. Such persuasion almost always proves successfuL
But see Note, Due Process Challenge to the Korean Status of Forces Agreement, S7
Geo. L.J. 1097 (1969).
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C. Special Cases: Civil Administration Courts
In that rarest of situations where the alternative local court is a branch
of the United States judiciary rather than an article III court, civilian and
military courts have held that O'Callahan does not divest the military of
jurisdiction.'5 7 Until recently, Okinawa was governed by the United States
under the terms of a peace treaty with Japan. Thus, it was clearly an oc-
cupied zone of a foreign country.'0 8 Under his power of sovereignty over
the islands, President Truman established a dual system of administration,
one composed of local civilians (the Ryukyuan Government), and one ap-
pointed by the President (the Civil Administration Government). Simi-
larly, dual judicial systems were established, and the courts under the
Ryukyuan Government were denied jurisdiction over American military
personnel. 50 The courts under the Civil Administration Government could
exercise jurisdiction over personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice "only when the military commander concerned determines
not to exercise military jurisdiction . . . ."1' However, no military com-
mander on Okinawa had ever failed to assert military jurisdiction. 11
Against this background, the Court of Military Appeals in United States
v. Ortiz"0 2 dealt with the post-O'Callakan question of whether a serviceman
stationed in Okinawa could be tried by court-martial for a non-service re-
lated offense. Petitioner conceded that O'Callahan was inoperative in for-
eign countries, but attempted to make it relative by insisting that Okinawa
157. See text accompanying notes 162-82 infra.
158. See United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963).
159. Exec. Order No. 10,713, 3 C.F.R. 368 (1954-58 Comp.). The provisions for the
judicial system are: "Sec. 10: Judicial powers in the Ryukyu Islands shall be exercised as
follows:
(a) A system of courts, including the civil and criminal courts of original jurisdiction and
appellate tribunals, shall be maintained by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. These
courts shall exercise jurisdiction as follows:
(2) Criminal jurisdiction over all persons except (a) members of the United States forces
or the civilian component . . . ." Id. at 369.
160. Id. § 10(c) at 370. "Criminal jurisdiction over persons subject to trial by courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. [§1 801 et seq.) will be
exercised by courts other than courts-martial only when the military commander concerned
determines not to exercise military jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and specifically indicates to the High Commissioner his approval of referring the case to
another court." Id.
161. Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp. 840, 842 (W.i). Okla. 1970).
162. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 21, 42 C.M.R. 213 (1970). Ortiz, a Marine Pfc., pleaded guilty before
a special court-martial to various offenses among which was the robbery of an Oklnawan
taxi-driver. Because the crime occurred in an area "outside the confines of any United States
military installation," it would apparently have been considered non-service related If
committed in United States territory. Id. at 22-24, 42 C.M.R. at 214-16.
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belonged in a special category since it was neither part of the United States
nor of a foreign country."ea In denying petitioner's claim, the court looked
first to the language of O'Callahan:
[T]he O'Callahan opinion tends to indicate that the cognizability of an act in a civilian
court established by... the administration of [an occupied zone of a foreign country]
does not preclude military prosecution of the act, if it constitutes a violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.164
The court next pointed out that the Supreme Court in O'Callahan was con-
cerned only with "functional" jurisdiction.00 According to the court,
courts-martial could be divested of jurisdiction only when an accused ser-
viceman may be tried in a United States civil court.' The government
contended that the Civil Administration courts were "not the kind of civil-
ian courts contemplated by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan."10 7 How-
ever, the court saw no need to reach that issue and held that because Civil
Administration courts in Okinawa lack jurisdiction over servicemen, mili-
tary courts are the only available forum."0 ' With no competing system of
justice for which the court might express a preference, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals held that military jurisdiction over all crimes committed by
servicemen should continue.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
is the only civilian court which has faced this unique problem, reaching
similar results through slightly different reasoning. In Williamson v. All-
dridge,6 s a former serviceman who had been convicted by a general court-
martial of murdering an Okinawan native filed a petition for habeas corpus,
relying chiefly on O'Callakan. The petitioner's argument was based on the
assumption that O'Callahan involved "functional" jurisdiction.'" He urged
that he should have had the benefits of indictment and a jury trial provided
for in the Civil Administration courts, which he apparently thought were
open and available branches of American justice."
163. Id. at 22, 42 C.AM.R at 214.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 24, 42 C.M.R. at 216.
166. Id. "Assuming, however, that we attribute too much to the quoted statement [O'Cal-
lahan's comment on the crime being committed in United States territory], the civilian courts
of Okinawa have no power to try the accused." Id. at 22, 42 C.M.R. at 214.
167. Id. at 23, 42 C.MYR. at 215.
168. Id. at 23-24, 42 C.M.R. at 215-16.
169. 320 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1970). Williamson had been off-base, on leave, and
in civilian clothes at the time of the offense. Id. at 841.
170. Id. at 843.
171. Id. at 841. The government admitted and the court found that the Civil Admin-
istration courts were "United States civil courts." Id. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. at
273. But see United States v. Ortiz, 20 U.S.C.v.A. at 21, 42 C.M.R. at 213.
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The Williamson court conceded that Civil Administration courts did
provide for indictment and trial by jury but pointed out that these rights
emanated not directly from the Constitution, but from the President's
powers to administer the Ryukyu Islands." 2 Since the President could
have altered whatever rights were given in the Civil Administration courts
at his pleasure, the trial of Williamson's case in these courts "would not
have secured to him United States Constitutional rights as contemplated
by O'Callahan v. Parker."' 73 Using reasoning found in Gallagher v. United
States, 74 Bell v. Clark, 75 and United States v. Keaton,10 the court noted
that because there could be no denial of constitutional rights where none
existed, there was no bar to military jurisdiction.""
The court stated, in dictum, that it would permit military jurisdiction
even if O'Callahan required only the availability of any alternative civil-
ian court. 7 8 Like other courts, the Williamson court turned toward result
orientation, and refused to believe that the Constitution would require re-
mand of a serviceman to a foreign court. It pointed out that the crimes in
O'Callakan were "'committed within our territorial limits' M and ex-
plained that "crimes by servicemen in foreign countries rare] distinguish-
able from the situation in the O'Callahan case."'' 10 The court was unwilling
to remit a serviceman to the local courts even though jury rights were
granted.' 8 ' It attempted to compare the "essentially retributive" atmos-
phere of a military court to the attitude of a local jury composed of a
"recently defeated enemy," concluding that in this case military justice
actually favored the accused. 82
172. 320 F. Supp. at 842.
173. Id. at 843.
174. See text accompanying notes 146-56 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 111-32 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 97-109 supra.
177. 320 F. Supp. at 843. The import of this holding-that the protection of the Constitu-
tion does not extend to United States citizens when tried in certain courts established by the
United States-would seem to have been invalidated by Covert and the other civilian court-
martial cases, all of which concerned crimes arising overseas. Those civilians were deemed to
be under the protection of the Constitution even though their purportedly justified courts-
martial were authorized under provisions other than article III. If the actual provision of
the rights themselves is less important than their constitutional foundation, the crimes of
which O'Callahan was accused look more like Williamson's. There was no right under the
Constitution to an indictment and trial by jury when O'Callahan was charged. Any rights
given similarly situated servicemen were gratuitously passed by states, which could, like
the President, have removed them at will. See Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 272, 41
C.M.R. at 272 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
178. 320 F. Supp. at 843.
179. Id. at 844, quoting 395 U.S. at 273.
180. 320 F. Supp. at 844.
181. Id.
182. Id. The jury which would have tried Williamson would have been composed of
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IV. OVERSEAS MILITARY JURISDICTION RE-EVALUATED
A. The O'Callahan Case
If case law can be said to be settled on any point arising out of O'Calla-
han, it would seem to be so on the question of its application overseas. As
the above discussion indicates, both civilian and military courts have de-
veloped standardized reasoning to dismiss challenges to military jurisdic-
tion over non-service connected offenses abroad. Each court which has
had the opportunity to apply O'Callahan to crimes committed overseas has
first looked to the "basis" of the decision. They have typically held that
the essence of O'Callahan was the removal from military jurisdiction of
those cases which should be tried only after an indictment, and which
should receive a jury trial. Where the alternative would have been a trial
in a foreign court without constitutional guarantees, the courts ruled that
it was a serviceman's privilege to have his trial in an American court-mar-
tial, where most constitutional protections applied, rather than in a for-
eign court.
The lower courts' obvious reluctance to consign Americans to foreign
courts for trial was dealt with by the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert,"s'
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,84 McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guagliardo,8 5 and Grisham v. Hagan.8 0 Refusing to elevate result
orientation above constitutional principles, the Court in these cases simply
noted the problem and passed to the issue of Congress' powers under article
I, section 8, clause 14 .1S7 The finding of inadequate congressional power
leading to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction overcame whatever doubts
the Court may have had."' Even the possibility that the crimes could be
of little interest to the foreign authorities, and might therefore go unpun-
ished, was of little significance. Lower courts dealing with O'Callahan ap-
pear to have given inadequate consideration to the probable real effects of
local Okinawans who might accurately have reflected the community's condemnation of
the act charged. As a defeated enemy, the Okinawan jurors might have retained anti-
American feelings, or that sentiment might have germinated welI after the termination of
hostilities. Despite that possibility, however, President Kennedy apparently had sufficient
confidence in the judgment and impartiality of the Japanese in 1962 to remand United States
dependents and civilian employees to their control. Exec. Order No. 11,010, 3 CY.R. 587
(1959-63 Comp.), amending Exec. Order 10,713, 3 C.F.R. 368 (1954-58 Comp.) which
granted criminal jurisdiction to Civil Administration courts to include "[ciriminal juris-
diction over (a) the civilian component, (b) employees of the United States Government
who are United States nationals, and (c) dependents, excluding Ryukyuans, (i) of the fore-
going and (ii) of members of the United States forces." Id. § 2(2) at 590.
183. 354 US. 1 (1957).
184. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
185. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
186. 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
187. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 19, 41.
188. Id. at 48-49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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a contrary holding. In fact, it appears that the United States servicemen
who are tried in foreign courts are treated as well as and, in many cases,
more leniently than they would be in a court-martial."' 9
If result orientation is to be avoided, the courts must return to O'Callahan,
particularly as interpreted in the latest circuit court decisions, Flemings v.
Chafee,190 Schlomann v. Moseley, 9' and Gosa v. Mayden.10 2 Each of these
cases squarely faced the key question of whether the Supreme Court in
O'Callahan held that:
[C]ourts-martial lacked power over the subject matter and person of such a soldier
because Congress had no constitutional authority to vest it, or [whether] O'Callahan
decide[d] that the lack of grand and petit jury procedures (and perhaps other civilian
court protections) resulted in the loss of jurisdiction otherwise within the control of
congressional grant?193
Unlike the cases deciding the overseas application of O'Callahan, the
courts in Flemings, Scllomann, and Gosa ruled that the military court
actually lacked subject matter jurisdiction over non-service related crimes.
Particularly in light of Flemings, the entire basis of the traditional applica-
tion of O'Callahan to overseas offenses must be re-examined. The questions
appear to be threefold: (1) Is O'Callahan to be read as denying to Con-
gress the power under article I, section 8, clause 14, to vest jurisdiction
over relevant crimes in the military? (2) If O'Callahan is to be so read,
should it be fully applicable overseas? or, (3) Even if it is not to be so
read, can a broad judicial deference to military jurisdiction over crimes
committed abroad be justified? It is submitted that the Supreme Court
meant subject matter jurisdiction when it repeatedly used that term.
There are several different methods of analyzing O'Callahan which sup-
port the view that it was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction that dictated
the result in that case. The first of these may be described as a literalist's
view of the Supreme Court's wording. O'Callahan can be viewed as an
attempt to define the offenses which Congress could authorize courts-
martial to try under article I, section 8, clause 14. In using the term juris-
diction, the O'Callahan Court referred to the civilian court-martial cases
and other cases which defined the term as the adjudicatory power of
courts-martial. 4 Each of these cases relied on article I, section 8, clause
189. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 1, at 9, col. 1. Compare Department of Defense Statis-
tics on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribunals over United States Per-
sonnel 6 (Dec. 1, 1968-Nov. 30, 1969) (hereinafter cited as DOD Statistics] with Table of
Maximum Punishments, Manual for Courts-Martial, ff 127(c)(6) (rev. ed. 1969). See also
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1043, 1046 (1957).
190. See text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
193. Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir. 1971).
194. See Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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14 to limit military jurisdiction. Even though Judge Weinstein in Flemings
characterized the "jurisdiction" language of O'Callahan as showing a "lack
of precision" and "not completely lucid,"'19 he thought a "fair reading"
indicated that the reference was intended to be to a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.'9"
The three circuit courts which have decided O'Callahan's retroactivity
have entertained no doubts that the holding was cast in terms of "tradi-
tional" subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit in Flemings found
this conclusion "unequivocally" illustrated by the holding that "to be under
military jurisdiction," a crime must be service connected.0 T Any doubt
as to the wording of the holding might have been resolved by Justice
Harlan's O'Callakan dissent with its typically precise formulation of the
issue before the Court as "subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial." '
A concern for differences in the entire system of military justice rather
than the criticism and possible reform of the military system could prompt
a court to view O'Callahan as decreeing that cases involving such offenses
should be tried by a different court. This, Judge Weinstein ex-plained, in-
volves the classic subject matter jurisdiction of the court'10
A second method of concluding that the O'Callahan Court was interested
in delimiting the article I powers of Congress to legislate for military juris-
diction entails an analysis of the relevance of the jury trial and indictment
system to the O'Callakan result. A reading of the decision with its frequent
references to trial by jury might lead to quick acceptance of the reasoning
of the courts which have held O'Callahan inapplicable abroad; that is, that
O'Callahan had as its only function the implementation of a constitutional
guarantee of indictment and trial by jury, the absence of which divested
military courts-martial of functional jurisdiction. Yet the same "fair read-
ing" invoked by Judge Weinstein seems to confirm his finding that
"[O'Callalzan's] major thrust is directed to the basic differences between
systems of military and civilian courts rather than to a few defects of
procedure." 0° While the majority in O'Callahanz noted that indictment and
jury trial were the "constitutional stakes" of the case,2 1 this comment may
be read as primarily illustrative of these fundamental differences between
military and civilian systems. In fact, the Court listed other "stakes" to
illustrate its point. 22 In Flemings, Judge Weinstein noted, and a reading
of O'Callahan confirms, the Supreme Court's concern for "differences
195. 330 F. Supp. at 195-96.
196. Id. at 196.
197. United States ex reL Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544, 549 (2d Cir. 1972).
198. 395 U.S. at 276 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
199. 330 F. Supp. at 196.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. 395 U.S. at 262.
202. Id. at 264-66.
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with respect to tenure of judges and command influence.... differences
in the access of the defense to compulsory process .... [and] [d]iffer-
ences in evidence and procedure .... 2o0
O'Callakan's concern for the provision of indictment and jury trial
rights must be read in the light of other holdings on these same rights.
Some months prior to O'Callahan, the Supreme Court held in DeStefano v.
Woods 01 that it "[would] not reverse state convictions for failure to grant
jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968,' '2°0 making jury trials
not constitutionally required in cases tried before that date. O'Callahan
was tried by an Army court-martial in 1956-that is, at a time when he
had no constitutional right to be tried by a jury in a state court. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has never held a grand jury indictment in a state prose-
cution to be mandated by the Constitution.2 10 Thus, if the O'Callahan
Court was interested only in securing to defendants the benefits of indict-
ments and jury trials, it would have had no grounds upon which to act in
O'Callahan since Sergeant O'Callahan had no such constitutionally pro-
tected rights in 1956. In speaking of jurisdiction, the Court must have
had more in mind than a mere procedural deficiency which mandated a
preference for civilian courts.
The Supreme Court jury trial cases most frequently mentioned by courts
and commentators viewing O'Callahan as grand and petit jury oriented,
typically recommended reforms in the court's procedures to make them con-
form to constitutional standards." 7 In O'Callahan, however, the Court
never even mentioned simple reform of courts-martial to provide jury
trials and indictments in some form. The fact that the Court did not
suggest methods whereby courts-martial could assume jurisdiction over
non-service related crimes208 strongly suggests that O'Callahan should be
seen as a simple denial of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. O'Callahan Abroad
What would be the impact of the application of O'Callahan to overseas
crimes? One result could be the rejection of the contention that the powers
of Congress to legislate for military jurisdiction over servicemen overseas
are greater than they are when Congress legislates for domestic jurisdic-
tion. In Reid v. Covert,20 1 the Supreme Court denied that the "necessary
203. 330 F. Supp. at 196.
204. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
205. Id. at 635.
206. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884).
207. See text accompanying notes 200-06 supra.
208. See United States ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1972).
209. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
[Vol. 41
O'CALLAHAN OVERSEAS
and proper" clause enlarged article I, section 8, clause 14 overseas as to
civilians.2 10 Civilians were held to be immune from military jurisdiction
whether found abroad or at home, because the Court decided that it was
not necessary to discipline them abroad under the military system.2 11
While it may be argued that the need to discipline servicemen stationed
overseas is greater than the corresponding powers required over similarly
situated civilians, this was not necessarily the unspoken holding of Reid
v. Covert and its successors. The Covert Court could find no justification
for lowering its required showing of necessity just because the civilians'
offenses were committed abroad. Arguably, the courts should require no
lesser showing of military necessity to justify military jurisdiction over
servicemen's non-service related offenses committed overseas.
The cases which excluded overseas offenses from O'Callahan's reach
have viewed that case as concerned only with indictment and jury trial
rights.2' If the "subject matter jurisdiction" view is accepted, and the
"functional jurisdiction" rationale is no longer available, courts must re-
examine the problem of overseas jurisdiction by using the test established
by O'Callakan. In other words, they should test for service connection. In
Relford v. Commandant,213 the Supreme Court recommended an examina-
tion of at least twelve factors in each case to determine whether or not a
crime is service connected. 14 Especially important for consideration in
cases involving crimes committed by military personnel overseas is the
eighth criterion suggested by the Court in Relford; namely, whether or
not a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted is available.21
If the civilian court-martial cases are seen as ancestors of O'Callahan,
the case for requiring the absolute availability of civilian courts is
weakened. In those earlier cases, the Supreme Court was issuing a consti-
tutional holding, the effect of which would be to decide in which courts
210. Id. at 19.
211. Id. at 20-21.
212. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 97-109 supra.
213. 401 U.S. 355 (1970).
214. The twelve factors are: (1) the serviceman's proper absence from the base; (2) the
crime's commission away from the base; (3) its commission at a place not under military
control; (4) its commission within our territorial limits and not in the occupied zone of a
foreign country; (5) its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stem-
ming from the war power; (6) the absence of any connection between the defendant's
military duties and the crime; (7) the victim's not being engaged in the performance of
any duty related to the military; (8) the presence and availability of a civilian court in
which the case can be prosecuted; (9) the absence of any flouting of military authority;
(10) the absence of any threat to a military post; (11) the absence of any violation of
military property, and (12) the offense normally being among those traditionally prosecuted
in civilian courts. Id. at 365.
215. Id.
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the crimes would be tried, if at all. In his concurrence in Covert, Justice
Frankfurter noted that even if foreign courts were the only fora in which
to try civilians abroad with the armed forces, "these civilian dependents
would then merely be in the same position as are so many federal employ-
ees and their dependents and other United States citizens who are subject
to the laws of foreign nations when residing there."'2 10 In his Covert dissent,
Justice Clark called the possibility of prosecutions of American dependents
in foreign courts "an unhappy prospect not only for [the dependents] but
for all of us." '17 Justice Harlan, even though he agreed with that sentiment,
concurred with the holding that jurisdiction was lacking218
If there is any justification for military trials of overseas non-service
related offenses, it must rest on an appeal to the special needs of the mil-
itary when troops are stationed in a foreign country. The only instance in
which the government presented this argument to a court was in Gallagher
v. United States"' in the United States Court of Claims. The government's
argument had two essential elements: first, without military jurisdiction,
relations with the foreign nation could be irreparably damaged; and sec-
ondly, the morale, discipline and effectiveness of the forces abroad would
be impaired.220 The government contended that the military commander
abroad bears a greater responsibility to the population of the host country
than he would to a civilian community surrounding a similar base in the
United States. Theoretically, troops are admitted into the host country
"as military persons in the service of the United States at all times-
whether on duty or off duty."22' Because of this, the government success-
fully urged the court to find that the need for assuring the host country
that accused servicemen would be held accountable by the military au-
thorities was great enough to justify military jurisdiction. 22
The argument in favor of allowing a soldier nothing but an on-duty
life has been specifically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Gosa v. May-
den,2 1 which held that O'Callahan necessarily divided a soldier's life be-
tween times during which he could be subjected to military jurisdiction
216. 354 U.S. at 48-49 (footnote omitted). Though it may be said that many of the
civilians went abroad voluntarily, many of the federal employees were undoubtedly ordercd
abroad as part of their jobs. They accepted "voluntarily", but was the possible loss of em-
ployment which might result from a refusal so much less compelling as to distinguish them
from servicemen ordered overseas?
217. Id. at 90.
218. Id. at 76 n.12.
219. 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct, C.)Q, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
220. Defendant's Response 13-15.
221. Id. at 14.
222. Id.
223. 450 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1971).
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and times when he was immune.2 4 A serviceman should not lose this
division of status simply because he is outside the territorial limits of the
United States.
This approach may be stated in identical terms for American troops sta-
tioned in an American community. Non-service related offenses which
might inflame sensitivities in the American community would likely be
punished by civilian courts, which could reflect the level of community
disapprobation of the particular offense much more accurately than could
the military. A commander's need to assure an American community of
quick military justice has not swayed courts from holding that because
local communities are capable of punishing servicemen whose offenses have
a relation only to the local civilian community, the crimes must meet tests
for service connection. Similarly, foreign countries could be better situated
to punish offenses against members of local communities. The SOFA treat-
ies recognize this fact by providing for possible foreign trial of offenses in
cases of concurrent jurisdiction, but the consistently high waiver rate '
has given insufficient evidence upon which to postulate how local prosecu-
tors would act if they knew the accused American was not subject to court-
martial by his command.
Consistent application of the service connection test would leave to trial
by court-martial such crimes as those committed on base or at a time when
the offender was engaged in his military duties. Only those offenses held to
lack any connection to military discipline or necessity, such as the rape and
robbery committed by Bell and Gallagher, would be excluded from mili-
tary jurisdiction. For such crimes, if local authorities find that the offenses
do not merit trial, that decision should be accepted by the military, as it
must be in the United States. Under the applicable SOFA treaties, if
O'Callahan divested the military of jurisdiction, the non-service connected
overseas crimes of military personnel would be punishable only by local
civilian courts,2 ' just as in the United States.
Prosecutorial discretion would be an equal factor abroad or at home.
Local communities could in effect immunize a serviceman by failing to
prosecute his non-service related crimes if they were either insufficiently
aroused by an offense or failed to believe the evidence warranted a trial.
The military could not appeal for military jurisdiction on the ground that
it needed to prosecute the soldier to "maintain the smooth community rela-
tions necessary to the successful fulfillment of [the commander's] mis-
224. Id. at 757.
225. See DOD Statistics 2.
226. NATO-SOFA, art. VII, f 2(b).
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sion ' "17 as the government attempted in Gallagher v. United States. If a
soldier stationed in Germany assaults a German civilian in a local gast-
haus, why should the military be heard to complain of the need for a court-
martial to assuage the local community's anger? If the German prosecu-
tors know that they are the only ones who can deal with the offense and
still decline to charge the serviceman, should their decision be subject to
change?
Another theory upon which the government could be expected to base
an argument of military necessity is founded on the threat of "weaken [ing]
the military defense of the United States and the free world .... "2" The
government could contend that countries will be less willing to accept
United States troops if the military commanders lack constitutional power
to discipline them by courts-martial. 9 This contention ignores the tre-
mendous opposition encountered when NATO-SOFA was negotiated, when
European countries wanted to retain jurisdiction over visiting forces, bow-
ing only reluctantly to the United States' demands for extraterritorial mili-
tary jurisdiction"
The government has also contended that there is a "greater need to
maintain discipline among troops stationed in foreign countries,"2 1 and
that this requires a "broader military jurisdiction" than at home." Even
accepting that there is a greater need abroad, this argument is precisely
the one rejected under a different guise in O'Callahan.sB The nexus be-
tween off-base, off-duty offenses committed by servicemen in civilian
clothes against members of the surrounding community and the main-
tenance of military discipline was held to be insufficient to justify military
trial.2 4 In Gallagher, the government argued that "discipline and morale
depend in a large measure upon the impartial, equal and expeditious ad-
ministration of justice. Morale and discipline would be seriously jeopar-
dized under circumstances where only some members of the military con-
tingent abroad bear the consequence of their criminal conduct." 3 But is
this argument particularized for overseas troops?
Even if the Supreme Court adopted the interpretation of O'Callahan
227. Defendant's Response 15.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See generally Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1043 (1957).
231. Defendant's Response 15.
232. Id.
233. 395 U.S. at 272-74.
234. Id. at 273.
235. Defendant's Response 17.
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found in Gallagher236 and similar cases,23 it could still be argued that the
reach of military jurisdiction over all offenses committed abroad is un-
justified. There are some acts triable in a court-martial for which an ac-
cused serviceman would also be within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
federal courts.ms Courts would, in these circumstances, have to analyze the
service connection of the crime to determine whether military jurisdiction
should be allowed.239 The fact that jurisdiction in a federal district court
might attach should divest military courts of power over non-service re-
lated crimes under a consistent reading of any current theory of O'Cala-
han.
236. See text accompanying notes 146-56 supra.
237. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 111-32 supra.
238. Although the Supreme Court stated in Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195
(1918), that legislation is "presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the
law-making power has jurisdiction,' the question of whether Congressional legislation such
as criminal sanctions shall be given extraterritorial effect has been further refined. In United
States v. Bowman, 260 US. 94 (1922), the Court, in dealing with statutory construction,
explained: "Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder,
burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which affect the
peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of
them is to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial juris-
diction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative
the purpose of Congress in this regard. ...But the same rule of interpretation should not
be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality
for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government
to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed
by its own citizens, officers or agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Government because of the local acts required to constitute
them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would
be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity
for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the
law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be
inferred from the nature of the offense." Id. at 98 (emphasis deleted). Certain prohibitory
statutes, like the fraud on the government in Bowman, would fall within the latter classifica-
tion of criminal statutes in which, although they contain 'no words which definitely disclose
an intention to give [them] extraterritorial effect,... the circumstances require an inference
of such purpose." New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 US. 29, 31 (1925) (citation
omitted). See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933). The Supreme Court has
noted that other nations should not object to the exercise of American jurisdiction in these
cases since they involve conduct the punishment of which "could not offend the dignity or
right of sovereignty of another nation." Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381
(1948) (citations omitted). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 n.2 (1932).
239. The test would have to be the same as that applied in the United States, since it
could be rendered meaningless if courts adopted the "test" proposed by the government in
Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371, 1373, cert. denied, 400 US. 849 (1970).
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The key test of whether the law is to be applied by implication overseas
is whether the prohibited acts are "directly injurious to the [United States]
government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular
locality .... ",240 Under this test, many acts prohibited by articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice would be covered by other federal stat-
utes. Reasoning similar to that found in O'Callahan could hold them cog-
nizable only in a federal district court. The number of situations arising
under these statutes would undoubtedly be limited. The vast majority of
crimes committed by servicemen overseas appear to be readily classifiable
either as service connected under currently applicable tests for domestic
crimes, or as crimes against foreign persons or property. In neither case
would the conduct be prohibited by federal statutes. Nevertheless, if mili-
tary jurisdiction is to be divested by a judicial preference for trial in Uni-
ted States civilan courts whenever possible, courts and the military should
consider that courts-martial might not have jurisdiction where the inter-
est of the United States in prosecuting an offense seems to outweigh that
of the host country. For example, while on leave from his base in Germany,
Private A hears that a hated political figure, Congressman B, will be stay-
ing nearby. A takes his privately-owned pistol and unsuccessfully attempts
to kill B. Is A to be charged by the military, by German authorities, or by
the United States in a district court pursuant to section 351, Title 18
United States Code?241
Since A's conduct is proscribed by federal statute, the possibility of in-
dictment and trial by jury in a district court should give any court a chance
to exercise the O'Callahan preference for a civilian court by holding that
the military is divested of jurisdiction. Germany would undoubtedly have
an applicable statute prohibiting simple assaults or assaults with intent to
murder, but its interests in prosecution appear outweighed by those of the
United States.2 42 Even using the reasoning of Gallagher, Bell, and Keaton,
the military would be hard pressed to demonstrate a need for the court-
martial of A.
The case of a Sergeant C, who in his spare time runs off counterfeit
United States currency in his off-base apartment in Germany, and passes
240. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 351(c) (1970) provides: "Whoever attempts to kill or kidnap any In-
dividual designated in subsection (a) of this section [any Member of Congress or Member
Elect] shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
242. There would be concurrent jurisdiction between Germany and the United States.
See NATO-SOFA art. VII, f 3. Currently, the identity of the victim, the automatic waiver
agreement, and the normal willingness of host countries to allow the sending country to try
most offenses not committed solely against its local citizens would militate in favor of mili-
tary jurisdiction.
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them in a non-army, American currency exchange, may also be illustrative.
He has violated sections 472 and 473, Title 13, United States Code"' and
undoubtedly, article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as it
assimilates federal criminal statutes.2" Should C be charged in a United
States district court or in a military court-martial overseas? A quick if
not very well reasoned answer was given by the Court of Military Appeals
in United States v. Goldman.2 45 In Goldman, it may be recalled, 2"40 an ac-
cused possessor of counterfeit currency and military payment certificates
was charged in a court-martial in Vietnam under article 134. In a post-
O'Callahan petition for reconsideration, the issue of jurisdiction was raised
and rejected by the same two-to-one division of the court as in Mercer v.
Dillon. Judge Darden viewed the offense primarily as one committed
"while on active overseas duty in a zone of conflict,"24 7 noting that O'Calla-
han gave Goldman "no support." In his dissent, Judge Ferguson stated:
[T]his accused should have been returned to the United States and tried in a Federal
District Court for the two specifications under Article 134, alleging violation of section
472, Title 18, United States Code (possession of counterfeit military payment certifi-
cates and fifty-dollar bills, purporting to be obligations of the United States).2 48
C. American Military Jurisdiction Abroad:
History and Contemporary Construction
It is surprising that none of the cases yet decided on the overseas ap-
plication of O'Callahan have made reference to the American historical
precedents of peacetime overseas courts-martial. 24 The principle of con-
243. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970) provides: "Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters,
publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with lke intent brings into
the United States or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited,
or altered obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 473 (1970) provides: "Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, receives, or
delivers any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United
States, with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
244. See Manual for Courts-Martial, V 213(e)(1) (rev. ed. 1969). The Manual holds
that such offenses "are made applicable under the third clause of Article 134 to all persons
subject to the code regardless of where the wrongful act or omission occurred." Id. In the
United States, this has not survived O'Callahan, since crimes which do not meet the tests
enunciated by Relford and O'Callahan may not be assimilated under article 134.
245. 18 U.S.C.MA. 516, 40 C.M.k. 228 (1969).
246. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
247. 18 U.S.CM.A. 516, 517, 40 C.M.R. 223, 229 (1969).
248. Id. at 517, 40 CMR. at 229.
249. See generally F. Wiener, Civilians Under Military Justice (1967) ; W. Winthrop, Mili-
tary Law and Precedents (1920); Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military
justice, 6 Vnd. L. Rev. 169 (19S3).
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temporary construction is well established"' and has been used in partic-
ular in ascertaining the meaning of the trial by jury guarantees of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has noted that the words, "'trial by
jury' were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference
to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in
England at the time of the adoption of that instrument .... "' In the
"landmark" military jurisdiction cases of the nineteen-fifties and sixties,
the Supreme Court took whatever guidance was available from historical
precedent, particularly that from England. 5 2 This analytical method is not
without its detractors who argue that such reliance is out of place in light
of the "practical problem of maintaining discipline among the more than
three million men in uniform today.""ar Justice Harlan's dissent in O'Calla-
kan denigrated the use of history, noting that it was not binding or limiting
on current practice.2re
It seems at least arguable that if the framers could have anticipated the
contemporary composition of the Armed Forces as a group of citizen sol-
diers, they would not have wanted Congress to possess the power to deny
servicemen these fundamental rights given civilians. At the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, there was an 800-man army consisting en-
tirely of volunteers and professionals who had more surely chosen their
world and its accompanying law than today's draftee. 5 ' Whether it is ad-
visable today or not, the Supreme Court in O'Callahan seemed to give
great weight to the historical analysis, and lower courts might have been
better advised to examine the subject.
V. ELEIINATING THE PROBLEM: CONGRESSIONAL
PRoPOsALs FOR REFORM
The proposals for reform of court-martial jurisdiction which have been
made, both in and out of Congress, have been of two general types. On the
250. Attention must be "turned] to the words of the Constitution read In their his-
torical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers . . . ." United States v. ClassIc, 313
U.S. 299, 317 (1941). See also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925): "The language
of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and
to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted."
251. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930), quoting Thompson v. Utah, 170
U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
252. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. at 368; O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. at 268-71;
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 284-86; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
at 23-30.
253. Note, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1377, 1385 (1969).
254. 395 U.S. at 280.
255. See generally Comment, 15 Viii. L. Rev. 712, 720 n.41 (1970). If this argument Is
to be given weight, the return of an all-volunteer army should mean Congress would have
a freer hand under article I, section 8, clause 14. However, it is doubtful that this would be
acceptable to the courts.
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one hand, legislators and military spokesmen have attempted to persuade
Congress to fill the void left by Covert, Singleton, Guagliardo and Grisham
by extending some form of federal civilian jurisdiction to overseas service-
men and their dependents in criminal cases. On the other hand, measures
have been suggested or introduced which would have the effect of limiting
the jurisdiction of courts-martial more severely than it arguably is at pre-
sent. While the former proposals have been made both before and after
O'Callahan, the latter have generally been introduced after O'Callahan as
parts of amplified general military justice reform bills supplementary to
the Military Justice Act of 19680"
Since the decisions in the civilian court-martial cases, a recurring theme
in the drive to save United States jurisdiction over crimes committed by
civilians, dependents and employees accompanying the armed forces abroad
has been provision for trial by article III federal courts actually sitting
in the foreign country in which the crime was committed. Because the Su-
preme Court has issued no decisions applying O'Callahan overseas, dis-
cussion of this and other alternatives to military jurisdiction has centered
on acquiring jurisdiction over civilians who might escape punishment for
offenses committed overseas if, under the terms of the applicable SOFA,
the foreign state declines to prosecute. Bringing the typical crimes against
persons committed by servicemen and dependents abroad under federal
jurisdiction would require expansion of current criminal statutes. At least
three methods of doing so have been proposed: (1) assimilation of the
District of Columbia penal codes; (2) enumeration of specified overseas
federal penal statutes; or (3) extension of those federal penal statutes
now applicable to acts committed within the special maritime and terri-
torial jurisdictions of the United States. Although all of these proposals
were stimulated by the absence of jurisdiction over civilians accompanying
the armed forces, each included provisions for covering servicemen abroad.
Presumably, similar interest in reform would be kindled if O'Callahan
were applied in the future to overseas crimes.
The third alternative is favored by the Defense Department and the
armed forces,2 57 and it has engendered the most serious discussion. In the
first session of the 90th Congress5 ' and the second session of the 91st Con-
256. Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, §§ 816-73, 82 Stat. 1335, amending 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1956) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970)).
257. Letter from J. Fred Buzhart, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Repre-
sentative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 10, 1972,
on file in the Military Law Section, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of
the Navy.
258. HY.R 11244, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
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gress, 59 identical bills were proposed to "rectify" the limitation on court-
martial jurisdiction imposed by the Covert-Singleton-Guagliardo line of
cases. The bills proposed that offenses committed by United States soldiers
or civilians serving with or accompanying the armed forces be included in
the jurisdictional provisions of the special territorial and maritime juris-
diction. The jurisdiction attaches regardless of where the offenses occur.
Substantially the same approach was taken by two bills introduced in the
Senate during the 91st Congress.00 Statutes under this jurisdiction cur-
rently make criminal most of the serious crimes which commentators have
feared might go unpunished if the foreign state is disinterested and the
military courts lack jurisdictional power. Adopting these measures would
prohibit arson, assault, maiming, stealing, receiving stolen goods, murder,
manslaughter, attempting to commit murder or manslaughter, malicious
injury to property, rape, carnal knowledge of a female under 16 and rob-
bery.20'
If any of these jurisdiction-expanding proposals were adopted, and the
typical non-service related crimes become cognizable in an article III
court, a question would arise over the actual location of the court. An ap-
pealing but probably impractical solution would be the establishment of
mobile courts to hear cases wherever American forces and accompanying
civilians could be found. This solution appeals, if at all, because it offers
American-style procedure, to those who might otherwise be tried by mili-
tary courts-martial or local foreign courts. Apparently, recognition of the
practical problems inherent in this concept has discouraged its proponents
from pushing seriously for its implementation.
Extensive negotiations were necessary twenty years ago to obtain from
the numerous countries of NATO the SOFA rights currently in effect.2 "'
As offensive to national pride as the SOFA provisions were, the fact that
only military jurisdiction could be exercised was reluctantly accepted as
necessary.-6 Attempts to escalate our judicial presence in those countries
to article III status would more likely than not be met with opposition
directly traceable to offended national pride.0 4
259. H.R. 18857, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
260. S. 3188 and S. 3189, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
261. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 113, 114, 661, 662, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1363, 2031, 2032, 2111
(1970).
262. Supplementary Hearing on Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1953); see Hearings on
Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces and Military Headquarters
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (193).
263. Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1043, 1048-67.
264. Proceedings of the ABA Sect. of Int'l & Comp. L., Report of the Comm. on Status
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Even more pragmatic objections exist to the concept of the "roving"
article III court. There would necessarily be time lags of varying duration
before one of the "circuit-riding" judges arrived at the base to sit for mo-
tions at any article 39(a) session,265 and for trial. It would be asking too
much of Congress to believe that it would provide funds for large numbers
of life-tenured roving federal judges whose jurisdiction would be geograph-
ically unlimited, but confined to cases arising overseas and involving ser-
vicemen, dependents or employees. In addition to the delay involved in
importing a federal district judge into a military installation, the empanel-
ing of a jury might prove difficult. 60 Excluding the extreme case of a mili-
tary base in Antarctica, which would have insufficient personnel capable
of withstanding challenges by trial counsel based on their knowledge of
the case or of the accused, the larger bases might pose equally serious
problems in obtaining grand and petit jury members. This would be true
either if military personnel were excluded from jury lists, or, assuming
servicemen were eligible, if the requirements of duty prevented sufficient
numbers from being spared for jury service.
It has been argued that an accused might solve many of the problems
incurred in securing a jury trial by waiving such a right in favor of a trial
by judge alone 2er or by a court-martial. 0 Waiver of the right to trial by
jury, to be valid, must be free and knowing. 69 The servicemen's alterna-
tive of extended incarceration or accumulation of "bad time" (time not
counted in an enlistment period) might deter many servicemen from exer-
cising their rights, and the choice would be invalidated as coercive. 0 As
to waiving civilian trial in favor of a military court-martial, the choice
seems impermissible, since lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can
never be waived. 7' Thus, this alternative appears doomed in advance un-
less O'Callahan is read at its narrowest.
of Forces Agreements 120 (1959); see Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accom-
panying American Armed Forces Overseas, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 712, 725 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Jurisdiction]; United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 2S9 F.2d 927,
939 n26(d) (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Burger, J., dissenting), aff'd, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
265. Under article 39 of the U.C.M.J., 10 US.C. § 839 (1970), a military judge may call
for sessions to settle questions of law and evidence, to hear pleas, etc.
266. Sutherland, The Constitution, The Civilian, and Military Justice, 35 St. John's L.
Rev. 215, 223 (1961). But government employees who would otherwise qualify in the
United States could apparently be empanelled overseas without constitutional problems.
267. Id.
268. 44 TuL L. Rev. 417, 425 (1970).
269. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
270. See Schick v. United States, 195 US. 65, 71 (1904).
271. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 US. 237, 244 (1934); Ansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v.
Swan, 111 US. 379, 384 (1884).
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The unavailability of trained and qualified civilian counsel would pose
a delaying and possibly insurmountable problem to the article III court.
Though some American attorneys have followed servicemen over-
seas to represent them in foreign courts in criminal and martial actions,
larger numbers would be required to represent the new classes of defen-
dants who would be added to federal jurisdiction. Even if the milithry
changed its current policy of denying its JAG Corps officers the option of
representing servicemen in criminal matters in most American and all
foreign civilian courts, the accused servicemen and civilians might suc-
cessfully argue that their constitutional right to counsel was being
abridged because of the inadequate choice of attorneys.
Problems not unique to the imposition of article III courts would like-
wise be created. As in military courts-martial, compulsory process would
not extend to foreign civilians who had witnessed the offense, and other
foreign nationals who, would almost certainly be the victims of the alleged
crimes. 2 The federal rule27 excluding depositions except at the insistence
of defendants would only aggravate problems of production of evidence
and witnesses, and the entire constitutional question of trial in the vicinage
would be raised. In courts-martial, trials frequently occur thousands of
miles from the locale in which the crimes allegedly occurred. 74
The impracticability of establishing roving article III courts would
present no more serious a problem than a proposal envisioning return
of military (and civilian) offenders to the United States for trial in domes-
tic article III courts.25 The availability of a forum and a judge would
no longer be a problem since the accused could be tried in whichever
district he was first brought by the government.2 0 However the diffi-
culty of obtaining witnesses for the government and the defense would
seem to preclude its serious consideration. Foreign nationals could cer-
tainly not be compelled to leave their country and travel thousands of
miles to testify in a United States trial, even if transportation were pro-
vided at government expense. Compulsory process simply does not reach
that far.2  Even assuming that major government witnesses could be per-
272. 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 270, 273 n.30 (1958).
273. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a).
274. Cf. United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954), wherein
trial by court-martial occurred in Maryland even though the alleged offenses occurred in
Korea.
275. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.MA. 64, 67, 41 C.M.R. 64, 67 (1969). See also
Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371, 1374 (Ct. CI.)Q, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1970); see U.S. Coast. art. III, § 2.
277. United States v. Hofmann, 24 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (dictum); cf.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 467-68 (1945); Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas.
911, 912 (No. 5,657) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818).
[Vol. 41
O'CALLAHAN OVERSEAS
suaded to make the trip, the already considerable expense would be ex-
acerbated by defense requests for witnesses, making the cost of domestic
trials prohibitive.278 Alternatively, defendants might be able to unduly
influence the government's prosecutorial discretion by entering not-guilty
pleas along with demands for numbers of foreign witnesses. These fac-
tors could deal a serious blow to the uniform application of the law, since
the government might choose to prosecute only the most serious cases, and
within that category, only the ones in which convictions were certain. -"'
National sensitivities would be even more offended by this procedure
than by the upgrading of the courts which try servicemen in the locale to
article III status. Currently, the members of the community and the vic-
tims are at least able to see the offender brought to trial, and in almost all
cases without delay. The transfer of the case to the United States, as well
as the probability of requiring victims to travel abroad, would eliminate
whatever value there may be to a quick and visible punishment of offenses
by visiting forces against the local populace. If the imposition of article
III courts on the soil of a foreign state is likely to raise problems of re-
negotiating SOFA's, the complete removal of the offender would engender
many more difficulties&as It seems probable that the waiver rate in host
countries would drop sharply, at least in those cases of concurrent juris-
diction serious enough to be removed to the United States. In short, both
alternatives which have been advanced during the last ten years to "cor-
rect" the jurisdictional defects in courts-martial of civilians are equally
impracticable when applied to servicemen stationed overseas.
Long before the Supreme Court began to limit court-martial jurisdiction,
the American Legion was responsible for the introduction of a bill to
eliminate military jurisdiction over all civilian-type crimes, whether com-
mitted abroad or at home 28 More recently, the legislators who had hoped
in 1968 for a comprehensive overhaul of the military justice system have
sought to enlarge upon the reforms of the 1968 Act to achieve their aim.
Within three years, five major bills were introduced calling for major mili-
278. A defendant's right to compulsory process would certainly not be cut back from
its current form. See U.C.J. art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1970). See generally Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, 115(d) (rev. ed. 1969). Military personnel would, if made
available, be transported at government expense. It seems arguable that fundamental fair-
ness would require the government to transport foreign nationals needed by the defendant
if he could not (as would be expected) pay for them himself. See Criminal Jurisdiction,
supra note 264, at 724.
279. Criminal jurisdiction, supra note 264, at 724.
280. Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 461, 509-10 (1961).
281. H.R. 3455, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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tary justice reform. The bill most limited in scope and least relevant to
this analysis was introduced by Senator Sam Ervin in 1969. This bill pro-
posed that the protections available in administrative discharge proceed-
ings be enlarged.282 Congressmen Charles M. Whelan Jr. and Charles M.
Price have introduced bills paralleling the one introduced by then Senator
Tydings. All of these bills envision reform of the commander's authority
to select members and judges." Their chief, if not only target, is the of t-
repeated evil of command influence.
The three proposals contemplating extensive changes in military justice
along with changes in jurisdiction relevant to offenses committed overseas,
are those of Senators Birch Bayh2 84 and Mark Hatfield,'8 5 and Congress-
man Charles Bennett.28 Of the three, the Bayh bill makes the least sub-
stantive change in the military's jurisdiction to try offenses wherever
committed. 8 7 The only provision dealing with possible changes in juris-
diction is the bill's call for the appointment of a committee charged with
conducting a "thorough study" and within one year making recommenda-
tions to the President and Congress on, among other things, "the desirability
of transferring to the district courts of the United States jurisdiction of
certain cases involving desertion and other unauthorized absences from
the armed forces ....
The main thrust of the Bayh bill is especially directed toward enlarging
procedural safeguards in the military justice system. However, the thrust
of his argument, and the effect of his bill, stand to be undercut if his com-
mittee reports favorably on the above proposition and if affirmative action
is taken by Congress. As Senator Bayh noted in a statement accompanying
the bill, "at least 85 percent and perhaps as many as 90 percent [of mili-
tary prisoners] are men who have either absented themselves without
leave or deserted. ' 2 9 The transfer of these cases to district courts would
entail enough substantive problems to give the committee pause for
thought. Senator Bayh believes current court decisions, particularly
O'Callahan, go far enough to allow him to conclude:
Under [the existing limitation on courts-martial jurisdiction] and with the hope of
enactment of significant reforms, I do not believe that further curtailment of court-
martial jurisdiction over civilian-type offenses is appropriate at this time.2 D0
282. S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
283. Whalen: H.R. 6901, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Price: H.R. 2196, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971) ; Tydings: S. 3117, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
284. S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
285. S. 4168-78, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
286. H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
287. S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 805 (1971).
288. Id. § 1259 Sec. 4(a) (3).
289. 117 Cong. Rec. 5310 (1971).
290. Id. at 5310-11.
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Senator Hatfield agrees with current interpretations of O'Callahan which
hold that offenses committed overseas are somehow different and must
remain under military jurisdiction. In introducing his series of bills to
reform military justice, the senator stated that "except in cases which are
military by nature, or crimes of a civilian or military nature committed in
a foreign country by military personnel, military courts should not have
jurisdiction; Federal courts should."29' Hatfield emphasized the fact that
jurisdiction of military courts is different and more limited for crimes
"committed within the territorial limits of the United States."' 92 In fact,
his bills would specifically provide for military trial of crimes committed
by military personnel in areas outside the United States by dividing the
world into military judicial circuits and setting up methods for the detail-
ing of military judges and counsel and conducting pretrial investigations,
courts-martial and the review process.2
Under Senator Hatfield's proposal," 4 the military would retain jurisdic-
tion over all crimes committed by American servicemen abroad, while
military courts would retain jurisdiction over only eighteen typically
military offenses within United States territory.298 The other thirty-seven
offenses in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, among them such serious
military-type crimes as mutiny96 and aiding the enemy,9 7 and such
serious civilian-military crimes as larceny 9 8 and murder, 9 would be
transferred to federal district courts even if, as in Relford, they occurred
on a military base or contained other indicia of service connection.
The aim of the Hatfield bill seems to be the provision to servicemen,
wherever stationed, of the maximum number of procedural safeguards.60
Senator Hatfield has chosen to upgrade military safeguards while retain-
ing military jurisdiction overseas. It would seem Senator Hatfield would
favor returning military defendants charged with serious, non-service re-
lated overseas offenses to the United States for trial in article III courts,
just as he provides for servicemen stationed in this country.
The bill which makes the most differentiation between offenses com-
mitted within and outside of the territory of the United States was in-
291. 116 Cong. Rec. 27217 (1970) (emphasis added).
292. Id.
293. See S. 4168-78, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
294. S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
295. Jurisdiction would be maintained for offenses chargeable under articles 83, 84, 85,
86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115 of the U.C.AIJ.
296. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1970).
297. Id. art 104, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1970).
298. Id. art. 121, 10 U.S.C. § 921 (1970).
299. Id. art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1970).
300. See 116 Cong. Rec. 27218 (1970).
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troduced by Congressman Bennett.8 °l This bill proposed that the jurisdic-
tion of Upper (general) and Lower (special) courts-martial over crimes
vary according to whether the crimes are committed abroad or not. Upper
courts-martial would be given jurisdiction over ten of the more serious
military-type offenses regardless of where they are committed0 2 Nine
other serious but civilian-type offenses would be triable by upper courts-
martial only if committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.O °3 The proposed jurisdiction of lower courts-martial would be
understandably broader, but a sharp delineation is retained between crimes
cognizable in courts-martial without regard to the location in which they
are committed and a longer list militarily cognizable only when com-
mitted abroad. Lower courts would be limited to trying defendants accused
of less serious military-type offenses, 0 4 and to trying defendants for less
serious civilian-type offenses when committed outside United States juris-
diction. °5 The bill retains the controversial article 88,00 but transfers
jurisdiction over it to United States district courts, regardless of where its
violation occurs.807 District courts would have jurisdiction over any
violation of articles 109 through 134 inclusive, but only when committed
within the territorial limits of the United States. 08
The Bennett bill envisions trial by civilian court for civilian-type crimes
committed in the United States and proscribed by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice's current punitive articles. Military jurisdiction is granted
over offenses committed within the United States only for military-
oriented crimes in which civilian courts would have little interest and
301. H.R. 579, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
302. Jurisdiction exists anywhere for volation of articles 85, 92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, and 106. See H.R. 579 at § 818.
303. Articles 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, and 129. H.R. 579 at § 818.
304. Articles 15, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, and
105 may be charged anywhere. H.R. 579 at § 819.
305. Articles 88, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 127, 128, 130,
131, 132, 133, or 134 are cognizable only outside United States territory. H.R. 579 at § 819.
306. "Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the
Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department,
the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Com-
monwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct." 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970). See generally United States v. Howe, 17
U.S.C.MA. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967); Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An
Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1697
(1968).
307. The bill does not explain how this provision would function if the article were
violated outside United States territorial limits. Would the offender be returned to this coun-
try for trial?
308. H.R. 579 at § 820.
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expertise. Overseas, however, the military would be free to try servicemen
for every crime currently prohibited except offenses in article 88. Surely
Representative Bennett and the drafters of his bill must have given con-
sideration to the pragmatic problems of returning servicemen to the United
States for trial when the charge is a violation of any of the articles over
which jurisdiction is denied when committed within the United States.
The bill's safeguards go far toward equalizing protections in military and
civilian trials, but inclusion of the district court's exclusive jurisdiction
over article 88 is a tacit admission that the provisions of the bill stop short
of true equality. Seemingly as an afterthought, Congressman Bennett in-
cluded in his bill the same idea for an appointed committee to study sub-
sequent changes in military justice as did Senator Bayh. ° As proposed in
the Bayh bill, the committee would examine and report within one year to
the President and Congress on the feasibility of transferring AWOL and
desertion cases to district courts. Although Congressman Bennet would
deny that "military necessity" justifies continuing military jurisdiction
over many service connected crimes,310 he feels that there should be a
year's hiatus before assaulting the military system.
Passage of these pending bills would not hold out much hope for the
serviceman accused of a crime abroad which, if committed at home, would
be "non-service connected."311 Unless the charged violation is of article 88
(and the assumption made that Congressman Bennett's bill was passed),
current proposals for reform do no more and no less than courts which
have evaluated the problem. If reform and further limitation over military
jurisdiction overseas is to come, it is to the courts and not to Congress
that reformers and disgruntled servicemen should look.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Gallagher and Hemphil
might seem to militate against the success of future challenges. The "ab-
solutist" reading of O'Callahan may be less appealing to a court faced with
United States servicemen being tried by foreign courts instead of service-
309. Id. § 4(a).
310. In Bennett's bill, lower courts are prohibited from trying servicemen charged with
such service connected crimes as being drunk on duty (article 112), unless committed abroad.
Bennett must believe that the necessity of maintaining discipline and order in the services
can be met in the United States by civilian court prosecutions, or lesser forms of administra-
tive sanctions.
311. This assumes that servicemen would prefer not to be tried in a court-martial wherein
procedural and review rights at least partially conform to constitutional standards. Most
cases have seemed to place servicemen in this position. However, it must be remembered
that the servicemen are all attacking their prior military convictions, and would probably
not face an immediate foreign trial if their petitions succeed.
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men whose final appellate review was completed prior to the date of the
O'Callahan decision. A fair inference from the Court's omission of a
stronger and more specific disclaimer relating to the perceived problem
might be that the limitation was not thought particularly improper.
Another possible explanation for the Court's refusal to grant certiorari
in the two cases is the fact that both involved questions of retroactivity
and overseas application, and the Court may have preferred to limit its
consideration to a case supposedly requiring a decision on the former issue,
as it indicated when it granted certiorari in Relford.
Of more significance may be the Supreme Court's purported departure
from open hostility toward military justice31 The unanimous opinion in
Relford included no harsh words against military courts, even from
Justice Douglas. The "spirit of O'Callahan" which has been seen as a
tendency against continuing court-martial jurisdiction in many areas may
be a thing of the past. The Burger Court's views on military justice can
only be surmised, but the decision which will resolve the conflict between
the circuits on O'Callakan's retroactivity"33 should provide a clue to the
future direction of the Court. Where the "jurisdictional rationale" of
O'Callakan is used, as this article argues it should be, and regardless of
whether retroactivity is granted or denied, the same logic, equally applied,
could lead to a re-evaluation of the numerous holdings on O'Callahan's
applicability overseas.
312. See, e.g., Note, Military Jurisdiction: Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Offenses
Committed on Base in Violation of Security of Person or Property Upheld, 26 JAG J. 131,
133-34 (1971).
313. On June 20, 1972, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flemings v. Chafee and
Gosa v. Mayden and presumably will decide the retroactivity of O'Callahan v. Parker. The
Court consolidated the arguments in these two cases. Gosa v. Mayden, 450 F.2d 753 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 920 (1972) (No. 71-6314, 1972 Term); Flemings v.
Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Warner v. Flemlngs, 407 U.S. 919
(1972) (No. 71-1398, 1972 Term).
